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UNSHACKLING PLEA BARGAINING FROM
RACIAL BIAS
ELAYNE E. GREENBERG *
“History, despite its wrenching pain, cannot be unlived, [but] if faced
with courage, need not be lived again.”
Dr. Maya Angelou 1
When an African American male defendant tries to plea bargain an
equitable justice outcome, he finds that the deep-rooted racial bias that casts
African American men as dangerous, criminal and animalistic, compromises
his justice rights. Plea bargaining has become the preferred process used to
secure convictions for upwards of 97 percent of cases because of its
efficiency. This efficiency, however, comes at a cost. The structure and
process of plea bargaining makes it more likely that the historical racial bias
that exists against African American male defendants will taint the
negotiation process and justice outcomes. The racial profiling by the police,
the presumption of guilt rather than innocence for African American men,
the prosecutor’s discretion when charging the defendant, and the justice
negotiation’s speed all contribute to the harsher negotiated sentences that
African American male defendants receive compared to white male
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of Legal Practice and Faculty Director of the Hugh L. Carey Center for Dispute Resolution at
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Alkon, M. Eva Hanan, Sheldon Evans, Anna Roberts and Charles Bobis for their different
perspectives and insightful suggestions for this paper, and to Ashley Koefer (‘11), Supervising
Attorney at Brooklyn Defender Services, for her thoughtful critique of the plea-bargaining
worksheet. Thank you, Robert, for your thorough review. My appreciation to my research
assistants, John T. Burger (‘20) for his thoughtful comments, critical eye, and patient edits,
and Danielle Marino (‘21) for helping to finalize the edits.
1
MAYA ANGELOU, ON THE PULSE OF THE MORNING (1993). Angelou read the poem at
President Bill Clinton’s January 21, 1993 inauguration. Francesca Trianni, Watch Maya
Angelou Read a Poem at Bill Clinton’s Inauguration, TIME (May 28, 2014, 10:58 AM),
https://time.com/123204/maya-angelou-bill-clinton-inauguration/ [https://perma.cc/UD5EVYGN].
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defendants accused of similar crimes. These racially tainted outcomes
threaten the integrity of our justice system, and the core of our democracy.
This Article traces the origins of racial bias in plea bargaining by
chronicling the historical relationship among three societal developments:
slavery, the criminal justice system, and plea bargaining. The Article then
explains how plea bargaining’s structure, as it exists today, allows these
historical racial biases to manifest and fester. Culling from the research of
cognitive psychologists, dispute system design scholars, and anti-racism
educators, this Article prescribes organizational and procedural reforms to
unshackle plea bargaining from racial bias.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article prescribes structural and procedural reforms to debias the
plea bargaining process and help mitigate the racialized presumption of guilt
that deprives African American male defendants 2 of their justice rights. 3
Prosecutors use plea bargaining, our preeminent form of dispensing justice,
to negotiate the resolution of upwards of 97 percent of our criminal cases
because it is efficient. 4 However, when legal actors are negotiating the
possible justice outcomes for African American male defendants, this
efficient plea bargaining process also primes the deep-rooted racial biases of
the legal actors to emerge and discriminatorily shape those outcomes. 5 These
historically-rooted racial biases, known as implicit racial biases, then form a
presumption of guilt for African American male defendants. 6
Cognitive behavioral psychologists posit that legal actors involved in
plea bargaining are more likely than other legal actors to have their implicit
biases influence their decision-making process because of the confluence of
three factors. First, the legal actors involved in plea bargaining are often
unaware of their racial biases because such racial animus is counter to their

2
This Article focuses on African American male defendants because they have suffered
from a deeply rooted racism that has stereotypically regarded African American men as
dangerous and prone to criminality. This focus, however, is not to the exclusion of other forms
of discrimination and unfair bias. The ideas expressed in this paper have something to offer
more broadly beyond a particular understanding of an “African American male defendant.”
3
See KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME,
AND THE MAKING OF MODERN URBAN AMERICA 269 (2010) (noting how blackness is
synonymous with criminality).
4
Emily Yoffe, Innocence Is Irrelevant, ATLANTIC (Sept. 2017), https://www.theatlantic.c
om/magazine/archive/2017/09/innocence-is-irrelevant/534171/
[https://perma.cc/Y69J65A3].
5
See, e.g., Carlos Berdejó, Criminalizing Race: Racial Disparities in Plea-Bargaining,
59 B.C. L. REV. 1187, 1215 (2018) (finding racial disparities in plea bargaining outcomes
between white and Black defendants, specifically that white defendants have a greater
likelihood than Black defendants of having their initial charges reduced in plea bargaining);
Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795 (2012) [hereinafter Smith & Levinson,
The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias] (explaining how prosecutorial discretion contributes to
racialized justice outcomes in plea bargaining).
6
See, e.g., IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW (Justin D. Levinson & Robert L. Smith
eds., 2012) [hereinafter IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW]. Some scholars assert that
the presumption of innocence until proven guilty is an ideal that does not reflect the
presumption of guilt attached to all defendants as soon as they are arrested. See, e.g., Anna
Roberts, Arrests as Guilt, 70 ALA. L. REV. 987 (2019) (explaining how this presumption of
guilt is stronger and harder to overcome if the defendant is an African American male).
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motivation to work in the criminal justice system “to do good.” 7 Second, the
speed of the plea-bargaining process allows the legal actors’ racial biases to
remain unchecked. 8 Third, the broad, unfettered discretion of the legal actors
involved in plea bargaining allows racial biases to shape charging and justice
outcomes. 9
Consequently, African American male defendants know all too well that
our criminal justice system’s supposed guarantees of “justice for all” and
“innocent until proven guilty” do not apply to them. Even though
“presumption of innocence” is a legal 10 and human right, 11 the data show that
African American male defendants suffer a racialized presumption of guilt
in every part of the criminal system, including plea bargaining. 12 The data
are bone-chilling. In the United States, African Americans are 5.9 times more
likely to be incarcerated than whites. 13 By the end of 2017, eighteen- and
nineteen-year-old Black males were about twelve times more likely to be

7
See, e.g., MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES
GOOD PEOPLE (2013) (explaining how we all, despite our best intentions, unconsciously
absorb cultural biases); IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW, supra note 6 (discussing how
implicit racial bias adversely impacts the justice outcomes for black defendants to such an
extent that black defendants have become synonymous with criminality); SHANKAR
VEDANTAM, THE HIDDEN BRAIN (2010) (detailing how the part of our brain that is unconscious
may shape our decision-making in a way that contradicts our stated values).
8
See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 86–87 (2011) (explaining System 1
thinking in which fast, unconscious thinking allows biases to emerge).
9
See Smith & Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias, supra note 5 (looking at how
the broad discretion of prosecutors in charging defendants and in plea bargaining allows
prosecutors’ implicit racial biases to emerge and shape prosecutors’ decision-making).
10
See, e.g., John A. Seiff, The Presumption of Innocence, 25 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
53 (1934); Kenneth Pennington, Innocent Until Proven Guilty: The Origins of a Legal Maxim,
63 JURIST: STUD. CHURCH L. & MINISTRY 106 (2003).
11
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at 73 (Dec. 10, 1948).
12
See Ojmarrh Mitchell & Michael S. Caudy, Examining Racial Disparities in Drug
Arrests, 32 JUST. Q. 288 (2015); BESIKI LUKA KUTATELADZE & NANCY R. ANDILORO,
PROSECUTION AND RACIAL JUSTICE IN NEW YORK COUNTY: TECHNICAL REPORT (2014),
ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/247227.pdf [https://perma.cc/G7WK-P5F3]; LINDSEY DEVERS,
BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, PLEA AND CHARGE BARGAINING: RESEARCH SUMMARY (2011),
https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/media/document/PleaBargainingResearchSu
mmary.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4KB-GK8R]; WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2 (2011) (citing discrimination against black suspects as one of
the three causes for the dysfunction of our criminal justice system); JAMES FORMAN JR.,
LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA 155 (2017) (discussing
how police presume black youth in “high-crime” black communities are guilty, reinforcing
the stereotype of black people as criminals).
13
JENNIFER BRONSON & E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., PRISONERS IN 2017 1
(2019), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p17.pdf [https://perma.cc/GW6C-KAW7].

OF

2021]

UNSHACKLING PLEA BARGAINING

97

imprisoned than their white counterparts. 14 Substantiating the data, the reallife stories of the countless African American male defendants who have
suffered discriminatory injustices in our criminal justice system plague our
moral core and galvanize us to enact reforms. Professor Henry L. Gates, 15
the Central Park Five, 16 Michael Brown Jr., 17 Eric Garner, 18 Freddie Gray, 19
Alton Sterling, 20 Tamir Rice, 21 Emmet Till, 22 and Anthony Ray Hinton 23 are
among the long list of African American males who have suffered racial
injustices in our criminal justice system. 24 In the few short months while this
Article was readying for publication, Ahmaud Arbery, George Floyd, and

14

Id.
Harvard Professor Henry Louis Gates was arrested and charged with robbery as he was
trying to enter his own house. Elayne E. Greenberg, Dispute Resolution Lessons Gleaned from
the Arrest of Professor Gates and “The Beer Summit,” 25 ST. JOHNS J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 91
(2010).
16
N. Jeremi Duru, The Central Park Five, the Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of the Bestial
Black Man, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315 (2004).
17
Timothy Williams, Five Years After Michael Brown’s Death, His Father Wants a New
Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2019, 2:47 P.M.), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/09/
us/ferguson-michael-brown.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Ftimothy-williams&action
=click&contentCollection=undefined&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest
&contentPlacement=7&pgtype=collection [https://perma.cc/D85R-U3T7] (“[His death] set
into motion profound changes in policing, race relations and society that continue to
reverberate.”).
18
Joseph Goldstein & Nate Schweber, Man’s Death After Chokehold Raises Old Issue for
the Police, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/19/nyregion/staten
-island-man-dies-after-he-is-put-in-chokehold-during-arrest.html?smid=pl-share
[https://perma.cc/3NXU-ZDT4].
19
Camila Domonoske, Prosecutors Drop All Remaining Charges Against Officers in
Freddie Gray’s Death, NPR (July 27, 2016, 9:59 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2016/07/27/487606743/prosecutors-drop-all-remaining-charges-against-officers-infreddie-grays-death [https://perma.cc/UX4Q-DFG2].
20
Jason Hanna, No Charges Against Officers in Alton Sterling Death; Other Videos Are
Coming, CNN (Mar. 27, 2018, 6:22 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/27/us/alton-sterlinginvestigation/index.html [https://perma.cc/H272-RSTC].
21
Sean Flynn, The Tamir Rice Story: How to Make a Police Shooting Disappear, GQ
(July 14, 2016), https://www.gq.com/story/tamir-rice-story [https://perma.cc/6MG8-UFP9].
22
Emmett Till, BIOGRAPHY, https://www.biography.com/crime-figure/emmett-till
[https://perma.cc/VC5K-JDPE] (last updated June 23, 2020).
23
Anthony Ray Hinton, How I Got 30 Years on Death Row for Someone Else’s Crime,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/apr/27/anthony-rayhinton-death-row-a-legal-lynching-alabama-crime [https://perma.cc/S5H4-WWFN].
24
Unfortunately, the number of African American men who have suffered racial injustices
in the criminal justice system extends far beyond the names listed.
15
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Rayshard Brooks were added to the list of those African American men. 25
And the list keeps growing.
As the data and stories of injustice bring to light, this racialized
presumption of guilt influences who the police profile as criminal suspects, 26
the manner in which law enforcement engages with criminal suspects and
witnesses in the community, 27 the way in which the police interrogate
suspects, the charges brought against defendants, 28 the plea bargaining
negotiations, and the final sentence. 29 Looking back on U.S. history, this
racialized presumption of guilt is anchored in the United States’ deep,
racially discriminatory roots that built a society, an economy, and a criminal
justice system on slavery. 30 Under this discriminatory caste system, enslaved
African American males were stereotypically regarded as dangerous,
aggressive, animalistic, likely to use weapons, and prone to criminality. 31
25

Eliott C. McLaughlin, Ahmaud Arbery Was Hit with a Truck Before He Died and His
Killer Allegedly Used a Racial Slur, Investigator Testifies, CNN (June 4, 2020, 10:44 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/04/us/mcmichaels-hearing-ahmaud-arbery/index.html
[https://perma.cc/G3PP-U2KV]; What We Know About the Death of George Floyd in
Minneapolis, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/george-floyd.html
[https://perma.cc/F794-8YYN]; Christina Maxouris, Rayshard Brooks Was Killed a Day
Before He Planned to Celebrate His Daughter’s Birthday, CNN (June 15, 2020, 9:02 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/14/us/rayshard-brooks-atlanta-shooting/index.html
[https://perma.cc/T6FW-7TST].
26
See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 6 (discussing how this presumption of guilt at the time of
arrest is stronger and harder to overcome if the defendant is an African American male).
27
See, e.g., Rory Kramer & Brianna Remster, Stop, Frisk, and Assault? Racial Disparities
in Police Use of Force During Investigatory Stops, 52 L. & SOC’Y REV. 960, 975 (2018)
(finding that black civilians in New York face 27% higher odds of experiencing some form of
force during a stop compared to white citizens and 28% higher odds of having an officer draw
a firearm during the interaction); see also Devin W. Carbado, Predatory Policing, 85 UMKC
L. REV. 548 (2017) (detailing that the more law-abiding citizens in the community have
contact with the police, the higher their risk becomes of being profiled).
28
See, e.g., Berdejó, supra note 5, at 1215 (finding that black defendants in Wisconsin
were nearly twenty-five percent less likely to have their top charge dropped or reduced than
their white counterparts).
29
A Georgia study found that murders with white victims are eleven times more likely to
result in a death sentence than those committed against Black people. David C. Baldus,
Charles Pulaski & George Woodworth, Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An
Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661, 709 (1983).
30
See, e.g., The 1619 Project, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.c
om/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/1619-america-slavery.html [https://perma.cc/6K25-N4
A2].
31
See, e.g., Smith & Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias, supra note 5, at 798,
808 (discussing how prosecutorial discretion allows the prosecutor’s implicit biases to emerge
and causes racially disparate charging and plea bargaining outcomes); PAMELA NEWKIRK,
SPECTACLE: THE ASTONISHING LIFE OF OTA BENGA (2015) (chronicling how Ota Benga, an
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This racialized presumption of guilt was reinforced during the 1920s when
the criminal justice system, born and evolved from a society that
discriminated against African Americans, developed into a more professional
enterprise in which full-time police made arrests and prosecutors brought
charges. 32 Scholars have observed that creating full-time police and
prosecutors reinforced the presumption of guilt towards defendants. 33 The
United States further reinforced the racialized presumption of guilt during
the 1990s when it supported police racial profiling, unauthorized searches,
and pretextual stops to promote its War on Drugs and Violence. 34 To the
horror of many, this racialized presumption of guilt remains embedded in our
culture, 35 economics, 36 politics, 37 and criminal justice system 38 and
continues to be further stoked today. 39
African man, was captured, caged and shown, reinforcing the bias that African males were
animalistic); JENNIFER L. EBERHARDT, BIASED 134–52 (2019); Jerry Kang, Judge Mark
Bennett, Devon Carbado, Pam Casey, Nilanjana Dasgupta, David Faigman, Rachel Godsil,
Anthony G. Greenwald, Justin Levinson & Jennifer Mnookin, Implicit Bias in the Courtroom,
59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1135–37 (2012) [hereinafter Implicit Bias in the Courtroom]; HENRY
LOUIS GATES, JR., STONY THE ROAD : RECONSTRUCTION, WHITE SUPREMACY, AND THE RISE OF
JIM CROW 36 (2019) (chronicling with narration and illustrations the countless ways the freed
slave was kept enslaved during the Reconstruction and Jim Crow era and its relevance today).
32
See Lawrence M. Friedman, Plea Bargaining in Historical Perspective, 13 L. & SOC’Y
REV. 247, 257 (1979) [hereinafter Friedman, Plea Bargaining].
33
Id. The public attributed a legitimacy to the action of professional police and
prosecutors. After all, why would professional law enforcement arrest an individual and bring
charges against them if there wasn’t a legitimate reason?
34
See, e.g., FORMAN, supra note 12, 167–71 (critically examining how the government’s
policies to combat crimes had racially disparate justice outcomes).
35
Nikita Stewart, ‘We Are Committing Educational Malpractice’: Why Slavery is
Mistaught—and Worse—in American Schools, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/19/magazine/slavery-american-schools.html
[https://perma.cc/27UF-GYWJ].
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
See, e.g., Cassia Spohn, Race, Crime, and Punishment in the Twentieth and TwentyFirst Centuries, 44 CRIME & JUST. 49 (2015) (calling for an overhaul of sentencing procedures
such as the elimination or severely restricted use of the death penalty and sentencing those
convicted of non-serious crimes to diversion programs to reduce racial disparities); Berdejó,
supra note 5; IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW, supra note 6 (discussing how implicit
racial bias contaminates criminal justice decision-making).
39
See, e.g., Spohn, supra note 38; Berdejó, supra note 5; IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS
THE LAW, supra note 6; Vanessa Williamson & Isabella Gelfand, Trump and Racism: What
Do the Data Say?, BROOKINGS INST. (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/
blog/fixgov/2019/08/14/trump-and-racism-what-do-the-data-say/
[https://perma.cc/4E5B2T3X] (noting how President Trump’s racist rhetoric is causing an increase in hate crimes);
Mark Peterson, Claudia Racine & James D. Walsh, This Is America: The White Nationalists
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Legal scholars and criminal law activists have called for a total overhaul
of the criminal justice system to put an end to this system of racialized
injustice. 40 Although considered a laudable goal by many, 41 such reform
takes time, and that delay maintains the status quo. This Article focuses
instead on debiasing reforms in the plea-bargaining process as a more
immediate and realistic approach to stopping the cycle of racialized justice.
There are three justifications for this choice. First, the proposed reforms
target the plea-bargaining process—the primary form of criminal justice
decision making 42 and a hub of racialized injustice—to readily yield
improved justice outcomes for those African American male defendants
whose cases will be plea bargained. Because of the racialized presumption of
guilt, African American male defendants who plea bargain in state criminal
courts are more likely to be presumed guilty—even when factually
innocent. 43 Furthermore, those African American male defendants who are
guilty of a crime and opt to plea bargain are often penalized with harsher
outcomes because of their race. 44 This must change.
Among Us, INTELLIGENCER (Dec. 19, 2019), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/12/whitesupremacy-terrorism-in-america-2019.html [https://perma.cc/59QF-EVTC] (documenting
how the resurgence of white supremacy since President Trump’s election is a continuation of
the racism that has been institutionalized since the Civil War).
40
See, e.g., STUNTZ, supra note 12; Spohn, supra note 38, at 49; NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF.
LAW., THE TRIAL PENALTY: THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO TRIAL ON THE VERGE OF
EXTINCTION AND HOW TO SAVE IT 3 (2018) [hereinafter THE TRIAL PENALTY],
https://www.nacdl.org/trialpenaltyreport/ [https://perma.cc/UEM5-5F89] (explaining that
fewer than 3% of criminal defendants exercise their Sixth Amendment right to trial because
the prosecutor threatens the defendant with a higher sentence if the defendant refuses the
offered plea bargain and proceeds with trial).
41
See Spohn, supra note 38.
42
See THE TRIAL PENALTY, supra note 40.
43
See, e.g., Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov.
20, 2014), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty/
[https://perma.cc/WYA7-BVXM] (suggesting that greater information sharing between the
prosecutor and defense attorney, and magistrate involvement before the plea bargaining
process helped minimize the estimated two to eight percent of those innocent defendants who
plead guilty); see also NYCLA Justice Center Task Force: Solving the Problem of Innocent
People Pleading Guilty, 40 PACE L. REV. 1, 4 (2020) [hereinafter NYCLA Justice Center Task
Force Report], https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2016&context=
plr [https://perma.cc/R5W5-U8FA] (formulating recommendations to address the reasons
why innocent defendants may plead guilty such as reducing the number of court appearances
and creating protocols that would ease access and communication between incarcerated
defendants and defense lawyers).
44
E.g., M. Marit Rehavi & Sonja B. Starr, Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal
Sentences, 122 J. POL. ECON. 1320, 1321 (2014) (finding that average sentences for black
defendants in federal court were ninety months for black defendants and fifty-five months for
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Second, the universe of legal actors that can reform the plea-bargaining
process is discretely defined. These actors include defense lawyers,
prosecutors, and their respective offices. Unlike other criminal reform ideas
that require legislative changes and significant budgetary support, the
reforms suggested here just require acceptance by prosecutors and defense
attorneys. 45
Third, prosecutors and defense attorneys, the primary plea-bargaining
negotiators, are also the legal actors initially drawn to this practice area to
“do justice.” This committed group is more likely to be receptive to
reforming the plea-bargaining process and deliver more racially neutral
justice than apathetic legal actors who accept the status quo. 46
A threshold issue in developing this proposal for reform is
understanding why prosecutors and defense counsel, legal actors committed
to enforcing justice, still plea bargain in such a racially biased way. The
“why” provides the foundational justification for the proposals recommended
later in this Article. Cognitive behavioral scholars educate that our racialized
history has also remained embedded in our culture and has become
memorialized in an unconscious network of neurons that form our implicit
biases about African American males. 47 All Americans have these implicit

white defendants between 2008 and 2009); see also Berdejó, supra note 5, at 1215 (finding
that black defendants in Wisconsin were nearly 25% less likely to have their top charge
dropped or reduced than their white counterparts).
45
As a part of effective dispute system design, the dispute system designer must identify
the discretely defined universe of legal actors who are motivated and can take responsibility
for implementing plea bargaining reforms to increase the likelihood that the prescribed
recommendation will successfully be implemented. Stephanie Smith & Janet Martinez, An
Analytic Framework for Dispute Systems Design, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 123 (2009); see
also Pon Staff, What is Dispute System Design?, HARV. L. SCH. PROGRAM ON NEGOT. DAILY
BLOG (June 15, 2020), https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/dispute-resolution/what-is-disputesystem-design/ [https://perma.cc/9MT8-V3PD].
46
See, e.g., Liane Jackson, Change Agents: A New Wave of Reform Prosecutors Upends
the Status Quo, ABA J. (June 1, 2019), https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/changeagents-reform-prosecutors; ERIC GONZALEZ, BROOKLYN DISTRICT ATT’Y, JUSTICE 2020: AN
ACTION PLAN FOR BROOKLYN (2019), http://www.brooklynda.org/wp-content/uploads/
2019/03/Justice2020-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TKQ-XCLH]; THE TRIAL PENALTY,
supra note 40; Colyn Eppes, TRR Partner Lew Tesser Chairs Plea-Bargaining Task Force,
TESSER RYAN BLOG (Apr. 12, 2019), http://tesserryan.com/trr-partner-lew-tesser-chairs-pleabargaining-task-force/ [https://perma.cc/L54G-FXTJ]; see also Our Work and Vision, FAIR &
JUST PROSECUTION, https://fairandjustprosecution.org/about-fjb/our-work-and-vision/ [https:
//perma.cc/9RUV-FJSY] [hereinafter FAIR & JUST PROSECUTION] (last visited Sept. 7, 2019)
(explaining the mission of public prosecutors who wish to work together to develop
innovations that will promote better justice outcomes).
47
See BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 7 (explaining how implicit biases are formed).
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biases. 48 Thus, even though we may explicitly reject the United States’
discriminatory behavior, and it may appall us, we may still internalize the
racially discriminatory messages the media and broader culture communicate
to us. 49
Relevant to this Article’s point, these implicit biases influence the legal
actors in our criminal justice system, including the prosecutors and defense
attorneys who are the primary legal actors in plea bargaining. 50 Therefore,
although prosecutors and defense attorneys may not be explicitly biased, they
are still prone to unconsciously regard African American men as dangerous,
aggressive, likely to use weapons, and prone to criminality. 51 Such implicit
biases contaminate every aspect of the plea-bargaining process including the
evidence relied upon, 52 the severity of the initial charges, 53 and the final
sentencing agreement. 54 This implicit bias infects defense attorneys and
prosecutors alike, as well as the organizations that employ them. 55

48
See, e.g., Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV.
969, 970–71 (2006).
49
See BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 7; MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF
THINKING WITHOUT THINKING (2005) (explaining how our quick judgements or heuristics,
such as the ones prosecutors make about African American defendants, are likely to reflect
our biases); EBERHARDT, supra note 31.
50
See, e.g., Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racal Bias in Public Defender
Triage, 122 YALE L.J. 2626 (2013) (calling attention to the unconscious racial biases of public
defenders and suggesting how public defenders might mitigate their racial biases); Carly Will
Sloan, Racial Bias by Prosecutors: Evidence from Random Assignment (Dec. 28, 2019),
https://github.com/carlywillsloan/Prosecutors/blob/master/191228_sloan_jmp.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R2Q3-F8Z4]; Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, supra note 31.
51
Smith & Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias, supra note 5, at 798, 808; see
Duru, supra note 16, at 1357. Ironically, prosecutors and defense attorneys have their racial
implicit biases reinforced when they are working in a justice system that arrests and convicts
a disproportionate number of black defendants.
52
See Berdejó, supra note 5, at 1237; Celesta A. Albonetti, An Integration of Theories to
Explain Judicial Discretion, 38 SOC. PROBS. 247, 250 (1991).
53
See Berdejó, supra note 5, at 1191.
54
See David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence
from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & ECON. 285, 306 (2001).
55
See, e.g., Smith & Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias, supra note 5; Andrea
D. Lyon, Race Bias and the Importance of Consciousness for Criminal Defense Attorneys, 35
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 755 (2012) (alerting criminal defense attorneys to develop heightened
awareness of their own racial biases); Jeff Adachi, Public Defenders Can Be Biased, Too, and
It Hurts Their Non-White Clients, WASH. POST (June 7, 2016, 11:31 AM), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/06/07/public-defenders-can-be-biased-too-and-ithurts-their-non-white-clients/ [https://perma.cc/H9C3-9CRR] (explaining how a public
defender helps himself and office colleagues develop a heightened awareness of his own
implicit racial biases).
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The plea-bargaining process is particularly susceptible to becoming
infected by implicit racial bias. During plea bargaining, the racialized
presumption of guilt emerges, thrives, and shapes justice outcomes. Applying
the research of implicit bias scholars, we can understand how legal actors’
lack of self-awareness about their own racialized biases, 56 the justice
system’s driving need to use plea bargaining for efficient justice
resolutions, 57 and attorneys’ broad discretion in the plea bargain process 58 all
contribute to make plea bargaining a process that enables implicit biases
about African American male defendants.
Anti-racist educators contribute to this discussion by explaining that we
will not be able to manage our implicit racial biases unless we are also
prepared to take responsibility for how we benefit from maintaining the status
quo. 59 Acknowledging our implicit biases is not an excuse for failing to own
up to all the personal benefits we may have enjoyed from living in a racially
discriminatory society. 60 Although awareness of our implicit biases is a first
step, more must be done. 61 We must then own the deleterious impacts of bias,
discard our defenses about our racist beliefs, and examine the ramifications
of maintaining the status quo before we can effect meaningful societal
change. 62
This Article expands the scholarship about plea bargaining by “naming
the elephant in the room” and tackling how to mitigate the implicit racial bias
in plea bargaining. 63 The author prescribes organizational and individual
56

See Chris Chambers Goodman, Shadowing the Bar: Attorneys’ Own Implicit Bias, 28
BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 18, 43 (2018).
57
See Darryl K. Brown, The Perverse Effects of Efficiency in Criminal Process, 100 VA.
L. REV. 183, 189 (2014).
58
See, e.g., Andrew Manuel Crespo, The Hidden Law of Plea Bargaining, 118 COLUM. L.
REV. 1303, 1306 (2018); Rakoff, supra note 43.
59
See, e.g., ROBIN DIANGELO, WHITE FRAGILITY (2018); EBERHARDT, supra note 31;
IBRAM X. KENDI, STAMPED FROM THE BEGINNING (2016). These authors call for whites to
accept responsibility and take steps to develop a self-awareness of their implicit racial biases
and how this racism has advantaged them at the expense of black Americans.
60
DIANGELO, supra note 59, at 140–54.
61
Id. (discussing steps to address racism and white fragility).
62
See, e.g., DIANGELO, supra note 59, at 141–48.
63
Surprisingly, there is a paucity of scholarship about the negotiation process in plea
bargaining, and the initial scholarship that does exist has suggested how plea bargaining could
be improved by using a more interest-focused approach. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff,
Getting to “Guilty”: Plea Bargaining as Negotiation, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115 (1997);
Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Social Psychology, Information Processing, and Plea
Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 163 (2007); Jenny Roberts & Ronald F. Wright, Training for
Bargaining, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1445 (2016) (commenting on the lack of plea bargaining
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reforms for prosecutors, defense attorneys, and the organizations they work
within to address this implicit racial bias in plea bargaining. The suggested
reforms create a more intentional plea-bargaining process, heighten
awareness of the implicit racial bias of the legal actors involved in plea
bargaining, and incentivize greater accountability for racialized justice
outcomes in plea bargaining. The proposals integrate the work of cognitive
behavioral psychologists, 64 anti-racism educators, 65 dispute system
designers, 66 negotiation scholars, 67 and criminal justice reformers. 68
This discussion will take place in four parts. Part I chronicles the
racialized roots of our country and our evolving criminal justice system,
within which plea bargaining has emerged and evolved. This Part puts
forward the dominant theories that explain why this racial animus has
persisted. Part II looks at plea bargaining practice today. Shifting to the lens
of implicit bias and anti-racist scholars, this Part shows how our racially
discriminatory history has shaped prosecutors’ and defense attorneys’
implicit racial biases and the racialized presumption of guilt. Part III
prescribes remedial organizational and individual interventions to help
district attorneys’ offices, public defenders’ organizations, and individual
defense attorneys and prosecutors contain their racialized implicit biases as
they negotiate justice for African American male defendants. The Article
concludes that the goal of the proposed reforms is to ensure that African
American male defendants who negotiate their justice outcomes do so
unshackled from racial bias.

training for defense lawyers); Cynthia Alkon, Plea Bargain Negotiations: Defining
Competence Beyond Lafler and Frye, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 377 (2016) [hereinafter Alkon,
Plea Bargain Negotiations]; Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Cynthia Alkon, Bargaining in the
Dark: The Need for Transparency and Data in Plea Bargaining, 22 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 434
(2019) [hereinafter Schneider & Alkon, Bargaining in the Dark]; Ronald F. Wright, Jenny
Roberts & Betina Cutaia Wilkinson, The Shadow Bargainers, CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming
2021) (offering empirical research comparing and contrasting the different plea bargaining
approaches between prosecutors who negotiated in the “shadow of the trial” and defense
attorneys who negotiated in the “shadow of the client”).
64
See, e.g., BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 7; Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, supra
note 31; Smith & Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias, supra note 5.
65
See, e.g., DIANGELO, supra note 59; EBERHARDT, supra note 31; KENDI, supra note 59;
IBRAM X. KENDI, HOW TO BE AN ANTIRACIST (2019).
66
See, e.g., Smith & Martinez, supra note 45.
67
See, e.g., ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES (2011).
68
See, e.g., Schneider & Alkon, Bargaining in the Dark, supra note 63.
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I. THE HISTORICAL ETIOLOGY OF RACISM IN PLEA BARGAINING AND THE
U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
One can best understand plea bargaining as a component of the U.S.
criminal justice system through the racialized societal values, objectives, and
cultural forces in which plea bargaining was born and has matured. 69 There
are three sociological theories of causation that help us understand why
racism began and persists. 70 Critical race theorists such as Richard Delgado
postulate that U.S. legislators hierarchically structured our laws to maintain
white privilege and Black inferiority. 71 Through a critical race theorist lens,
these legislators based our laws and criminal justice policies on a racism
intended to maintain this biased social hierarchy. 72 Through a slightly
different lens, conflict theorists such as Austin Turk assert that persistent
racism is about the dominant group maintaining social control. 73 According
to conflict theorists, our criminal justice system applies law to reinforce the
power of the politically and economically dominant group while
simultaneously controlling the power of racial minorities who threaten the
dominant group’s social control. 74 Proposing a third theory about why racism
persists, attribution theorists assert that, when there is inadequate objective
information, criminal justice enforcers such as police, probation officers, and
judges make racist decisions based on heuristics that African American
defendants are prone to criminality. 75 For attribution theorists, the
defendant’s race evokes criminal justice enforcers implicit biases about
African American men and biases justice decision making. 76
Whether you read this Section through the lens of any of these three
sociological theories or just for historical interest, you will find each frame
complements the others and expands our understanding about pernicious
racism in our criminal justice system. Historical racism has also created a
racial implicit bias that contaminates the plea-bargaining process today. This
first part of this Section chronicles the evolution of the racialized
69

Friedman, Plea Bargaining, supra note 32, at 258.
Spohn, supra note 38 , at 52–54.
71
See, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY 27–29 (2d ed.
2012); see also Spohn, supra note 38, at 52.
72
See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE
MOVEMENT (Kimberlé Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller & Kendall Thomas eds., 1995)
(explaining how the law accepted race as a biological fact and reinforced black subjugation).
73
AUSTIN T. TURK, CRIMINALITY AND LEGAL ORDER (1969) (focusing on how those in
authority assert control when there are legal violations); Spohn, supra note ,38, at 53.
74
TURK, supra note 73; Spohn, supra note 38, at 53.
75
Darnell F. Hawkins, Explaining the Black Homicide Rate, 5 J. INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE 151, 154 (1990); Spohn, supra note 38, at 53.
76
Hawkins, supra note 76, at 160–61; Spohn, supra note 38, at 53.
70
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presumption of guilt in plea bargaining by examining how the history of the
criminal justice system and the history of discrimination against African
Americans are inextricably linked. Who are targeted as criminal? What
behavior is criminalized? How are laws disparately applied? How is justice
delivered? Race determines the answers to all these questions. The second
part of this Section narrates the evolution of plea bargaining. As part of that
discussion, the reader will see how our criminal justice history and the United
States’ history of discrimination against African Americans converged to
shape the racialized presumption of guilt that exists in plea bargaining today.
A. THE INEXTRICABLE LINK BETWEEN THE U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM AND THE HISTORICAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
AFRICAN AMERICANS

From its inception, our criminal justice system evolved within a country
that was founded on the dehumanization of and discrimination against
African Americans. 77 Expectedly, this discriminatory animus contaminated
every aspect of the criminal justice system, biasing the interpretation and
application of racially-neutral legal codes. 78 Ironically, while the citizenry
embarked on developing a criminal justice system that was meant to be fair
and just, it simultaneously embraced its racist legacy and discriminatory
beliefs against African Americans. Sadly, that same struggle continues today.
The American Revolution galvanized the colonists to create a criminal
justice system that was fairer and more just than the oppressive British
system. 79 This goal was evident from the multiple safeguards the colonists
incorporated into their developing criminal justice system. For example, both
the Bill of Rights and state constitutions reinforced the importance of fair
trials and just punishments that were proportional to the crime committed. 80
Criminal codification, the process by which crimes would be “open,
transparent and easy to know,” was also viewed as a necessary safeguard to
protect the colonists against a reoccurrence of the abuse they had endured
under the King’s rule. 81 The goal was to create a criminal justice system that
could not be misused for retaliating against those taking unpopular political
stances. 82 Another safeguard that protected against the harms they
77
See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 433–53 (3d ed.
2005) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN, HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW] (narrating how the developing
criminal justice system reflected the discriminatory values of the time).
78
Id.
79
Id. at 207.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 215.
82
See id.
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experienced was to disfavor the death penalty as a punishment for theft and
only to use it as a last resort. 83 Instead, some colonists considered the
restitution of property and hard labor as more appropriate punishments for
theft. 84
The goal of labeling a behavior as “criminal” was to reinforce the social
and economic hierarchy and to maintain control of those on the bottom. 85
Thus, the decision to label a behavior as “criminal” was and remains a fluid
concept. During the colonial era of the 1700s, the citizenry viewed crime as
a public wrong that hurt society. 86 The primary goal of criminal law was to
enforce the existing social morality. 87 Although fornication and drunkenness
were the most frequently punished crimes, behavior such as gaming,
idleness, and lying were also considered criminal. 88 At that time, the public
considered crime a symptom of societal ills such as family problems, poverty,
or inappropriate companions, and, as a social problem, they could not be
remedied by the death penalty. 89 Rather, the purposes of punishment were
“to deter crime and rehabilitate the criminal.” 90
Moreover, the public elite criminalized these activities to maintain
economic control. 91 For example, society criminalized fornication to
maintain the accepted morality of the time and because it was concerned with
who would support any children that resulted from such a “sinful act.” 92
Times change, and with them, so did criminal justice’s priorities. After the
Revolution, as economic crimes increased, the criminal justice system’s
focus shifted more to protecting property and less to proscribing
fornication. 93
Even though the colonists wanted to create a fair and just criminal
justice system, the safeguards they adopted to protect against unfair
prosecution and tyranny did not apply to Black people in the South. 94 Rather,
society subjected enslaved people and those disfavored in the lower social

83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

See id. at 33.
Id.
See id. at 36, 37.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 35.
Id.
Id. at 208.
Id.
See id. at 37.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 218.
Id. at 436.
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order to the uneven and biased enforcement of criminal laws 95 and
disproportionate capital sentences. 96 Slave codes further reinforced the
community biases against African Americans. 97 In the slave codes, as well
as other laws, enslaved African Americans were considered chattel and
forbidden to learn to read. 98 Those free African Americans who were living
in the North also experienced discrimination as a result of the deeply
entrenched racist ideas that America was founded on and were subjected to
the racially disparate application of criminal laws. 99
At about the same time as our criminal justice system was beginning to
develop after the Revolutionary War, the first vigilante or self-help justice
groups were also forming. 100 These vigilante groups proliferated in the West
buoyed by the conviction that “swift and terrible retribution is the only
preventive course, while society is organizing in the far West.” 101 A variant
of these vigilante groups were the slave patrols made up of local citizens. 102
These patrols would catch and whip enslaved people who were on the streets
past curfew or without the requisite pass from their owners. 103 In 1767, the

95

See id. at 35.
Id. at 209.
97
See id. at 36.
98
See generally John M. Mecklin, The Evolution of Slave Status in American Democracy,
2 J. NEGRO HIST. 229, 250 (1917) (discussing how the slave codes treated slaves as “irrational”
chattel while denying them the opportunity to learn to read and write); see also Rachel L.
Swarns, The Nuns Who Bought and Sold Human Beings, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/02/opinion/sunday/nuns-slavery.html
[https://perma.cc/UE5B-KNM2] (describing the history of racism in the Catholic Church and
how one group of nuns sold their slaves and separated slave families to fund their commitment
to free education for the poor).
99
See, e.g., Mecklin, supra note 98; see also SHERRILYN A. IFILL, ON THE COURTHOUSE
LAWN: CONFRONTING THE LEGACY OF LYNCHING IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2018).
101 See FRIEDMAN, HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 77, at 440; cf. Anna North, “The
Oppression Doesn’t End It, It Adapts”: America’s History of Lynching and Its Resonance
Today, VOX (updated June 20, 2020, 12:23 PM), https://www.vox.com/21295670/robertfuller-malcolm-harsch-hanging-history-lynching [https://perma.cc/2NSE-SCRZ]; Ben Yakas,
NYPD Investigating Suicide of Black Man Found Hanging from Tree in Manhattan Park,
GOTHAMIST (June 17, 2020, 4:03 PM), https://gothamist.com/news/nypd-investigatingsuicide-black-man-found-hanging-tree-manhattan-park [https://perma.cc/87LB-7RQK]; Jake
Offenhartz, Report of Nooses in Van Cortlandt Park Met by NYPD Indifference, Bronxites
Allege, GOTHAMIST (June 19, 2020, 4:27 PM),
https://gothamist.com/news/reports-nooses-van-cortlandt-park-met-nypd-indifferencebronxites-allege [https://perma.cc/PEN3-23EZ] (showing how lynching continues in 2020).
101
FRIEDMAN, HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 77, at 440 (quoting THOMAS J.
DIMSDALE, THE VIGILANTES OF MONTANA 13 (1953)).
102
Id. at 213.
103
Id.
96
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first American vigilante group, the South Carolina Regulator, emerged. 104
After 1850 and abolition, vigilante groups proliferated and came in different
iterations. 105 For example, there were the claims clubs in the Midwest,
miners’ courts, 106 the Ku Klux Klan, 107 and Judge Lynch 108 in the southern
border states. Although all these vigilante groups were about delivering their
own form of extrajudicial justice, the Southern lynch mobs were known as
the most brutal because “their law and order was naked racism, no more.” 109
At the conclusion of the Civil War, the United States abolished slavery,
and all African Americans were ostensibly free. However, the Supreme Court
countered and muted the Thirteenth, 110 Fourteenth, 111 and Fifteenth 112
Amendments, laws intended to reinforce African Americans’ rights to
freedom, by limiting their application to state action. 113 Jim Crow Laws,
southern codes that sought to preserve the hierarchal status quo between
white land owners and enslaved people, reaffirmed that African Americans
were still “less than.” 114 The Reconstruction period that was supposed to free
enslaved people just continued slavery in a different form. 115 For example,
formerly enslaved people who worked for a share of profits on the same
plantation that they worked when they were enslaved often were deprived of

104

Id. at 440.
Id.
106
Id. (resolving disputes over mining rights).
107
Id. at 430 (maintaining white supremacy).
108
Id. at 440 (perpetuating black men’s enslavement by burning and hanging those who
were accused of crimes).
109
Id.
110
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, §§ 1–2 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. Congress shall have power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”).
111
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein
they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.”).
112
U.S. CONST. amend. XV (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.”).
113
See Francisco M. Ugarte, Reconstruction Redux: Rehnquist, Morrison, and the Civil
Rights Cases, 41 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 481, 481–82 (2006).
114
See, e.g., FORMAN, supra note 12, at 66.
115
STUNTZ, supra note 12, at 105–11 (describing the Reconstructionist massacres by
white citizens and law officials against black people); see also GATES, supra note 31.
105
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the profits that they should have rightly earned. 116 As Bryan Stevenson
elegantly states:
In many ways, you can say that the [N]orth won the Civil War, but the [S]outh won the
narrative war. If the urgent narrative that we’re trying to deal with in this country is a
narrative of racial difference. If the narrative that we have to overcome is a narrative of
white supremacy, the south prevailed . . . . [A]nd that’s what we were dealing with at
the beginning of the 20th century when we began an era where white supremacy, racial
subordination, racial hierarchy is going to be enforced in a new way: lynching. 117

After Reconstruction and continuing into the mid-twentieth century,
African Americans found that the type and quality of justice they received
depended on which part of the country was dispensing the justice. 118 For
example, African Americans in the South found that the criminal justice
system was augmented by mob rule. 119 Similarly, justice in the West for
African Americans was an amalgam of a somewhat effective justice system
aided by vigilantism. 120 In the Northeast and Midwest, however, African
Americans had a greater likelihood of receiving fairer justice outcomes
because these justice systems were relatively more stable and less punitive. 121
Still, researchers reported that African Americans received greater sentences
than whites for similar crimes throughout the United States during the 1930s
through the ‘60s. 122
For those formerly enslaved people who remained in the South, many
increasingly found life in the South intolerable. During the Great Migration,
formerly enslaved people sought greater opportunity in the North, free from
the racial animus of the South. But many African Americans who migrated
soon realized that, even in the North, they faced discrimination, just in a
different form. 123 For example, employers gave preference to European

116

See, e.g., ISABEL WILKERSON, THE WARMTH OF OTHER SUNS: THE EPIC STORY OF
AMERICA’S GREAT MIGRATION (2010) (explaining that during Reconstruction many formerly
enslaved people remained de facto enslaved because they worked on the same land, were
charged for the land and living expenses, and either got little profits, no profits or in the worst
scenario, owed a debt to the landowner).
117
TRUE JUSTICE: BRYAN STEVENSON’S FIGHT FOR EQUALITY (HBO 2019) [hereinafter
TRUE JUSTICE DOCUMENTARY].
118
STUNTZ, supra note 12, at 130.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 134.
122
Spohn, supra note 38, at 73 (noting that researchers’ methodology and degree of actual
racism was challenged).
123
FORMAN, supra note 12, at 88 (“No facet of African American life was exempt from
the stranglehold of racism.”).
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immigrants for many of the jobs African Americans sought. 124 Further, as
Historian Isabel Wilkins observed:
“The century between Reconstruction and the end of the Great Migration perhaps may
be seen as a necessary stage of upheaval. It was a transition from an era when one race
owned another; to an era when the dominant class gave up ownership but kept control
over the people it once owned, at all costs, using violence even; to the eventual
acceptance of the servant caste in the mainstream.” 125

Not only was there a racial divide between Black and white
communities, a class divide also emerged between poor Black people and
upper-middle class Black people. 126 In poor Black neighborhoods, where
there remains a higher crime rate than in white neighborhoods, society
victimized—and continues to victimize—both Black criminals and Black
victims. 127 The police racially profile Black people as criminal suspects. 128
Because the crime rate is higher in Black neighborhoods, Black victims find
that the police are less likely to respond seriously to their requests for help
than to white victims. 129 In this “racial tax,” police see Black citizens “first
as potential criminals who need punishing, not as possible victims who need
protecting.” 130 Exacerbating this problem, Black communities, until recently,
did not have the political power to elect officials who would advocate for
them and remedy this problem. 131 The result of the police’s discriminatory
perception is that Black communities often do not receive the policing they
need.
During the 1960s, the Civil Rights Movement called attention to the
pervasive racial discrimination that African Americans suffered in every
aspect of their lives, including the racist treatment by police departments. 132
Fed up with such discriminatory treatment, Black citizens protested in the
cities and demanded change. 133 During these protests, Black citizens
publicized the widespread police corruption and the police’s flagrant
disregard of legal criminal procedures, especially towards Black people, such

124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133

See, e.g., id. at 89.
WILKERSON, supra note 116, at 538 (2010).
See, e.g., FORMAN, supra note 12, at 139 (talking about black-on-black crime).
STUNTZ, supra note 12, at 22.
See, e.g., FORMAN, supra note 12, at 212.
STUNTZ, supra note 12, at 22.
Id.
Id. at 7.
FORMAN, supra note 12, at 98.
Id. at 104.
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as arresting suspects without warrants. 134 Police abuse without any
accountability and retribution had to change. 135 Did it?
During the ‘70s and ‘80s, the drug epidemic and gun violence plagued
the country and threatened the viability of Black communities and their
citizenry. Black communities referred to crack cocaine as “the worst thing to
hit us since slavery.” 136 Black leaders analogized the crack epidemic to the
savagery Black people experienced at the hands of the Klan. Jesse Jackson
asserted, “[n]o one has the right to kill our children . . . I won’t take it from
the Klan with a rope; I won’t take it from a neighbor with dope.” 137
The United States fought back against the drug epidemic and gun
violence with its War on Drugs. During the War on Drugs, the United States
enacted punitive policing policies, stricter drug laws that penalized drug
possession with the same severity as drug dealing, and mandatory minimum
sentencing. 138 The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, which
included the Sentencing Reform Act, was one such sweeping criminal justice
reform to accomplish these ends. 139 The Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994 was another. 140 All of these criminal interventions
had a racially disparate impact on African Americans. War was being waged,
and African Americans were now presumed guilty, rather than innocent. 141
They endured repeated unprovoked searches and pretextual traffic stops. 142
African American imprisonment rates were greater than those of Stalin’s
Soviet Union. 143
The push for these criminal policies came not only from white
politicians and their constituents, but also from Black officials and the Black
middle class. 144 What does it say about our country that the response to this
drug crisis was with criminal solutions rather than root-cause solutions? 145
Both white and Black supporters failed to predict that these measures would
134

Id. at 98.
Id.
136
Id. at 151 (quoting the president of the NAACP).
137
Id. at 157.
138
Id. at 156.
139
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837.
140
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1796.
141
FORMAN, supra note 12, at 155; see also Marcia G. Shein, Racial Disparity in Crack
Cocaine Sentencing, 8 CRIM. JUST. 28, 61–62 (1993).
142
FORMAN, supra note 12, at 198.
143
STUNTZ, supra note 12, at 253.
144
FORMAN, supra note 12, at 134 (detailing how government policies to combat crime
had a disparate impact on the black community).
145
Id. at 157.
135
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have such a racially disparate impact on poor, Black communities. 146 Many
consider these draconian criminal measures a leading cause of the racialized
mass incarceration that exists today.
William J. Stuntz reminds us that the mass incarceration of Black people
today is, in fact, slavery. 147 First, “incarceration is a form of slavery.” 148 The
Thirteenth Amendment provides, “[n]either slavery, nor involuntary
servitude, except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall exist in the United States.” 149 However, because African
American male defendants are forced to navigate a racialized criminal justice
system, too many are deprived of a fair and just process and often unduly
convicted. Second, prisoners, like enslaved people, are subjugated to the will
of their jailers. 150 Prison is all about subjugation, not rehabilitation. Third,
incarceration, like slavery, is a way of controlling the poorest, least
educated. 151 Part of the subjugation is keeping the incarcerated poor and
uneducated. A disproportionate number of black prisoners who are
incarcerated do not receive the adequate training or education necessary to
reenter the world as contributing citizens. Fourth, prisoners, like enslaved
people, are unable to vote and decide who is chosen to rule. Even when Black
people are finished serving their prison sentences, they remain shackled to
their incarcerated status. 152 Finally, as with the fear that surrounded ending
slavery, a fear exists about reform efforts to reduce the number of
incarcerated people. 153 Thus, prison reform efforts to end the mass
incarceration of Black men are blocked by entrenched, racialized fears.
Professor Sheldon Evans offers a different analogy to illustrate how the
racialized justice outcomes of our criminal justice system are a continuation
of the discriminatory values underlying slavery. Professor Evans notes a
146

This failure to predict the harsh, disparate racial outcomes has been a topic of intense
debate particularly in the midst of the 2020 Democratic primary debates. See, e.g., Shaquille
Brewster & Adam Edelman, Kamala Harris Hits Biden Over ‘Mass Incarceration’ from
Crime Bill, NBC NEWS (May 15, 2019, 2:55 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020election/kamala-harris-disputes-joe-biden-s-claims-about-1994-crime-n1006106
[https://perma.cc/26BW-9G3M]. Senator Kamala Harris attacked Vice President Biden for
drafting the 1994 crime bill that resulted in the mass incarceration of black people. While
defending the bill’s preventative measures, Biden asserted that his intent was good, and the
context in which the ‘94 bill was passed was different than today.
147
STUNTZ, supra note 12, at 44.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id.
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sobering link between how society perpetuated slavery and our modern law
enforcement system. 154 “So, like the ‘slave catcher’ roots of our modern
police force, law enforcement are incentivized to catch ‘criminals’ in African
American communities, as their slave catching predecessors were, to return
them to the racial hierarchy that maintained what they saw as a proper
balance in society.” 155 The modern system of criminal justice enforcement in
the United States is in many ways a continuation of a slavery system that
fosters racialized discrimination against African American male defendants.
In the following part of this Section, the author will explain how the
racialized presumption of guilt took hold in the plea-bargaining process.
B. THE EVOLUTION OF PLEA BARGAINING AND THE RACIALIZED
PRESUMPTION OF GUILT

Plea bargaining is when a criminal defendant offers to plead guilty in
return for concessions in the offenses charged and the sentences imposed. 156
This Part chronicles the evolution of plea bargaining. When plea bargaining
finally became the primary justice resolution process for criminal cases, the
legal actors involved continued to be influenced by the discriminatory
animus that historically contaminated the criminal justice system. This
discriminatory animus helped to shape the presumption of guilt towards
African American male defendants and involve it in plea bargaining.
Plea bargaining scholars disagree about when plea bargaining began to
be used in the criminal justice system. 157 One reason for this disagreement is
that it is difficult to ascertain if a guilty plea before trial was a result of a plea
bargain. 158 Moreover, during the early 1800s, courts disfavored and
discouraged guilty pleas. 159 There were multiple reasons for the distrust of
guilty pleas. First, from as far back as the 1600s, guilty pleas were often
154
Comments from Professor Sheldon Evans to author (Oct. 27, 2019) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Comments from Professor Sheldon Evans]; see also Gloria J. BrowneMarshall, Stop and Frisk: From Slave-Catchers to NYPD, A Legal Commentary, 21 TROTTER
REV. 98 (2013) (analogizing NYC Police Department’s stop and frisk policy to the Black
Codes); Larry H. Spruill, Slave Patrols, “Packs of Negro Dogs” and Policing Black
Communities, 53 PHYLON 42 (2016) (drawing the link between slave patrols and oppressive
policing in black communities).
155
Comments from Professor Sheldon Evans, supra note 154.
156
Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 211, 213
(1979).
157
See, e.g., Friedman, Plea Bargaining, supra note 32, at 248; Alschuler, supra note 156,
at 215; GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN
AMERICA 4 (2003).
158
Alschuler, supra note 156, at 214.
159
Id. at 215–16.
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coerced by the King. 160 Second, there were concerns that the guilty plea
might be entered by an innocent person who just was fearful, hopeless, or
forgetful. 161 Third, many defendants did not have attorneys. 162 Fourth, at that
time, the punishment for committing a felony was death, so defendants were
less likely to voluntarily plead guilty to felony charges. 163
Another reason it is difficult to determine the exact moment plea
bargaining began is that it is difficult to distinguish between implicit and
explicit plea bargaining. 164 Implicit plea bargain refers to when “there is no
actual bargaining but defendants realize they are better off if they plead
guilty.” 165 “Hence defendants who plead guilty strike a kind of bargain even
though no word of a ‘deal’ has been spoken.” 166
The first regular use of plea bargaining is said to have taken place during
the attempted resolution of Massachusetts liquor cases in 1824. 167 The
structure of the liquor law provided a defined dollar penalty for each
enumerated offense, depriving judges of any sentencing discretion. 168
Prosecutors, however, had discretion. Unlike judges, prosecutors were able
to use that discretion and charge defendants with lesser offenses that came
with a lower dollar penalty. 169
Yet, during the 1800s there was no pressing need to mainstream plea
bargaining. During that time, the criminal system was not yet
professionalized and rendering justice was simpler than it is today. Public
prosecutors worked part-time, and during the course of the 1800s, the police
were first introduced as part of law enforcement. 170 Even during the late
1800s, the trial process was still simple and brief. 171 A trial would last less
than thirty minutes. 172 During the trial, each side could present one or two
witnesses before a jury rendered a verdict. 173 There were still part-time
prosecutors and no fingerprint or ballistic technology. 174
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174

See id. at 240–41, 241 n.35.
Id. at 225.
Id. at 217.
Id.
Friedman, Plea Bargaining, supra note 32, at 253.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id.
See FISHER, supra note 157, at 25.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 25–26.
See Friedman, Plea Bargaining, supra note 32, at 257.
See id. at 257–58.
Id. at 257.
Id.
Id.
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It was not until the 1920s that explicit plea bargaining took hold. 175
Multiple reasons contributed to plea bargaining’s acceptance. First, the
criminal justice system became more professionalized with the increased
prevalence of police, prosecutors, and defense lawyers. 176 This contributed
to the court’s greater comfort with guilty pleas. Second, criminal law was
also being shaped by the introduction of “the bondsman, the ward politician,
the newspaper reporter, the jailer, and the fixer.” 177 Third, there was an
expansion of the criminal law. 178 Fourth, with growing urbanization, there
was a concomitant growth in crime. 179 Particularly, there was a growth of
victimless crimes such as liquor-prohibition cases that were harder to
convict. 180 Fifth, as political corruption infiltrated the criminal justice
system, a “fixer” of some political influence, police officers, and court
officers were all instrumental in helping procure pleas. 181 Sixth, and finally,
trials became longer and more complicated, making pleas a more efficient
option. 182
One significant and unexpected change caused by the
professionalization of our criminal justice system is that the presumption of
innocence that had always existed until a defendant was proven guilty at the
conclusion of a trial was replaced with a presumption of guilt when an arrest
was made by the police and prosecutors who brought charges. 183 This
presumption of guilt, combined with racial animus towards African
American defendants, made plea bargaining for African American men a
175

Alschuler, supra note 156, at 229.
Id. at 242.
177
Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the
United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 924 (1994).
178
Alschuler, supra note 156, at 234.
179
Id. at 242.
180
Id. at 230.
181
Id. at 228.
182
Alschuler, supra note 156, at 240.
183
See Friedman, Plea Bargaining, supra note 32, at 257. This is an “unexpected”
outcome because citizens supported the legitimacy of police and believed that police officers
would not arrest an individual without cause. Intuitively, however, one could understand why
the professionalization of criminal justice actors undermines the presumption of innocence
writ large. By creating an entire workforce dedicated to the capture and incarceration of
individuals, it stands to reason that police, prosecutors, and judges face pressure to ‘do their
jobs’ by investigating, prosecuting, and convicting guilty parties. Conversely, these pressures
may not be present for the exoneration of innocent defendants; if the defendant were to be
found innocent, then one of these professional bodies would have erred somehow in its duties.
This asymmetry, while potentially prejudicial to all defendants, may be especially prejudicial
to poorer, African American male defendants, who, as discussed earlier, are more likely to be
perceived as dangerous and, vis-à-vis, guilty.
176
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risky justice choice. Thus, the danger of plea bargaining is that the “factually
innocent may be convicted” because they have negotiated away the
protection of their trial rights. 184
Not only did plea bargaining grow, but so did guilty pleas. Researchers
note that during the 1920s more convictions came from guilty pleas than
bench or jury trials. 185 There were several reasons that defendants pleaded
guilty. First, prosecutors promised those already in jail that their case would
be dealt with quickly if they pleaded guilty. If they did not, they would suffer
long delays. Second, defendants were often represented by young, appointed
lawyers who lacked experience and received little compensation. 186 Thus,
these lawyers encouraged their clients to plead guilty rather than suffer
through a trial. Third, “court officers,” also known as “plead getters,” would
frighten defendants who were already in prison to plead guilty or face the
horrors of trial and a longer sentence. 187
As plea bargaining began to take hold, it attracted both supporters and
critics. 188 Plea bargaining concerned the Progressives because it was ripe for
prosecutorial corruption and allowed criminals a “pass” from receiving
punishment that actually corresponded to the seriousness of their crimes. 189
The Realists, however, regarded plea bargaining as a necessary way to
efficiently deal with burgeoning caseloads, and they prevailed. 190 Moreover,
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Brady v. United States, which came
down at a time when it was estimated that 90 to 95 percent of convictions
were the result of pleas, assuaged Progressives’ concerns and adopted
protections to ensure that guilty pleas were voluntary and not coerced. 191 In
Brady, the Court held that pleas were acceptable so long as the defendant had
competent counsel, there were no threats or false promises made while

184

Mike McConville & Chester Mirsky, Guilty Plea Courts: A Social Disciplinary Model
of Criminal Justice, 42 SOC. PROBS. 216, 216 (1995).
185
Friedman, Plea Bargaining, supra note 32, at 255.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
See generally William Ortman, When Plea Bargaining Became Normal, 100 B.U. L.
REV. 1435, 1459–65 (2020) (explaining why the supporters of plea bargaining favored its
efficiency and individuation while its critics feared it was “a corruption of the prosecutorial
function”).
189
Id. at 1437.
190
Id. at 1487–88 (The growing number of indictments compared with the number of
available judges to hear these cases made it a “physical impossibility to try each case.”). The
Katzenbach Commission said “our system of criminal justice has come to depend upon a
steady flow of guilty pleas.” Id. at 1488.
191
Id. at 1496 (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 n.10 (1970)).
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negotiating the plea, and the defendant made the plea “intelligently.” 192
However, the line between what is coerced and what is voluntary is blurry 193
and has not been applied in a racially-neutral way.
In fact, a closer look at state and U.S. Supreme Court decisions shows
that courts historically demeaned African American defendants and regarded
them as “ignorant negroes” to justify providing African Americans with
procedural justice protections during and after the 1960s. 194 For example, the
Supreme Court’s decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, which recognized a
defendant’s right to counsel in felony criminal cases, did not help African
Americans combat the institutional racism that denied them equal justice
under the law. 195 A lawyer was not sufficient protection to help African
American defendants overcome their lack of an affluent family, social
network, and credible witnesses—all of which are societal privileges that
help defend against criminal charges and avoid conviction. 196
From the 1970s onward, the U.S. criminal justice system established
plea bargaining as vital because efficiency became a priority at the expense
of rights. 197 McConville and Mirsky posited that plea bargaining’s usefulness
was that it was a socially acceptable way of “imposing control and discipline”
on those “highly visible sections of society, those who are perceived as
dangerous because of their lack of involvement in an acceptable labor market
and the intensity of their involvement with the criminal justice system.” 198
Under this model, the police are proactive, rather than reactive, using
surveillance and sweeps to target people of color. 199 All the legal actors
understand that there is a presumption of guilt. 200 Defense lawyers may not
interview witnesses or conduct further negotiations if the system presumes
their client is guilty. 201 “Subordination and degradation” were the tools used
to convince defendants to plead guilty. 202

192

Brady, 397 U.S. at 757.
Id. at 750.
194
Gabriel J. Chin, Race and the Disappointing Right to Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2236,
2241–42 (2013) (citing a litany of Supreme Court and state court decisions that referred to the
“ignorant negro,” reinforcing the stereotype of an African American as an inferior person).
195
372 U.S. 335 (1963); Chin, supra note 194, at 2240.
196
Chin, supra note 194, at 2255–57 (describing how white privilege is used to help the
white defendant avoid charges).
197
See Ortman, supra note 188, at 1495 n.397.
198
McConville & Mirsky, supra note 184, at 217.
199
See id. at 219.
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
Id. at 230.
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By the 1990s, certain scholars characterized the U.S. criminal justice
system “a steroid era in criminal justice.” 203 When Congress adopted
mandatory minimum sentences and sentencing guidelines, it made plea
bargaining an even more attractive option. 204 Today, plea bargaining is the
criminal justice system for many, with little constraint or oversight. Three
recent Supreme Court cases cast a crumb of hope that the Court recognizes
the need for court guidance on plea bargaining. 205 Yet, as we saw with
Gideon and other laws and decisions, these decisions will not help African
American defendants claim their justice rights if these decisions are applied
in a racially biased way.
II. THE PERPETUATION OF IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS IN PLEA BARGAINING
TODAY
This Section discusses how the United States’ historical legacy of racial
discrimination has formed our implicit biases about African Americans and
fuels the presumption of guilt in plea bargaining practice today. Even though
some consider implicit biases less blameworthy because they are
unconscious, implicit biases still have a pernicious impact on justice
outcomes. In this discussion, the author will explain how the plea-bargaining
process, as it operates today, allows the racialized presumption of guilt to
emerge and adversely shape the justice outcomes of African American male
defendants. Three conditions of the negotiating process prime the emergence
of implicit bias: the negotiation process’s speed; the prosecutors’ and defense
attorneys’ unawareness about their own implicit biases against African
American male defendants; and defendants’ and prosecutors’ discretion in
deciding the justice outcome.

203

Donald A. Dripps, Guilt, Innocence, and Due Process of Plea Bargaining, 57 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1343, 1350 (2016).
204
Id. at 1352.
205
See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162 (2012) (extending a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to counsel to include a defendant’s right to have competent counsel in the
plea bargaining process); Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 145 (2012); Lee v. United States,
137 S. Ct. 1958, 1967–68 (2017) (allowing the retraction of a plea because the attorney failed
to inform the defendant that a guilty plea could result in deportation); see also Alkon, Plea
Bargain Negotiations, supra note 63 (advocating that the Court expand its examination of
lawyer competence in plea bargaining beyond the counseling phase to the preparation and
negotiation phase); Cynthia J. Alkon, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Failure to Fix Plea
Bargaining: The Impact of Lafler and Frye, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 561, 565 (2014)
[hereinafter Alkon, Failure to Fix Plea Bargaining] (opining that Lafler and Frye fail to
address the systemic modifications that are needed in plea bargaining presented by the
Indigent Defense Structures and Prosecutorial Power Structures).
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A. OVERVIEW OF THE PROCESS 206

When an African American man gets arrested, the district attorney’s
office then has to decide whether to charge him, and if so, with what
offense. 207 The prosecutor on the case will make this decision, in large part,
based on the information the arresting officer gives the prosecutor. 208 Among
the country’s many district attorneys’ offices, the rules and procedures about
whether to charge a defendant are not uniform, and, if the accused is charged,
the rules about deciding what charges are appropriate are not uniform
either. 209 In some offices, the case prosecutor alone will make the decision
within twenty-four hours. 210 In other offices, the case prosecutor will consult
with a supervisor about what, if any, charges are appropriate. 211 If the
prosecutor decides to charge the accused, the accused has a right to be
represented by a lawyer.
Once a prosecutor brings charges, the defense attorney and prosecutor
usually have an opportunity to plea bargain. 212 Prior to the plea-bargaining
meeting, the defense attorney is likely to meet with her client to gather
information about what, if anything, happened and to understand her client’s
206

Please note that there is a paucity of law controlling the “rules” and “practices” of plea
bargaining. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751 (1970) (upholding a
prosecutor’s right to threaten defendants with a trial penalty); Lafler, 566 U.S. at 162; Frye,
566 U.S. at 145; Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1967–68.
207
For certain criminal cases, a grand jury will decide whether charges should be brought
against the defendant. See, e.g., CYNTHIA ALKON & ANDREA KUPFER SCHNEIDER,
NEGOTIATING CRIME: PLEA BARGAINING, PROBLEM SOLVING, AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE
CRIMINAL CONTEXT 39–45 (2019) [hereinafter ALKON & SCHNEIDER, NEGOTIATING CRIME].
208
The arrests and consequently the information about the arrests are often racially biased.
See, e.g., Ojmarrh Mitchell & Michael S. Caudy, Examining Racial Disparities in Drug
Arrests, 32 JUST. Q. 288, 296–97 (2015) (detailing how the racial biases of police contribute
to the racial disparities in drug arrests and thus the information police provide prosecutors
about the arrests are racially-biased); SENTENCING PROJECT, REPORT OF THE SENTENCING
PROJECT TO THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON CONTEMPORARY FORMS OF
RACISM, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, XENOPHOBIA, AND RELATED INTOLERANCE: REGARDING
RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE UNITED STATES CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 2 (Mar. 2018),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/un-report-on-racial-disparities/
[https://perma.cc/F8RB-NCKQ] (reporting on the racial disparities that exist in every aspect
of the criminal justice system in direct contravention of Article 2 and Article 26 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
209
See, e.g., Crespo, supra note 58, at 1334–39.
210
Joan E. Jacoby, The Prosecutor’s Charging Decision: A Policy Perspective, NAT’L
INST. L. ENF’T & CRIM. JUST. (Jan. 1977), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/35832
NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/QC6M-NY8S].
211
Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
2117, 2126 (1998).
212
Id. at 2125 (noting that it is often in a prosecutor’s interest to hear defense counsel’s
arguments).
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goals. 213 The meeting may take place in the defense attorney’s office, in jail,
or in the courthouse when the client is brought to be arraigned. If the client
is in jail, the attorney may have to navigate many security procedures that
make it harder to meet with her client. This attorney–client meeting may be
perfunctory; the two may review the client’s past criminal history, discuss
what happened and any extenuating circumstances, and clarify the client’s
goals. 214 In rarer circumstances, the attorney–client meeting may involve a
fuller understanding of the client as a human being, not just as a defendant,
and might conduct a follow-up investigation of the facts learned from the
client. It is likely that this client is one of many in an overflowing number of
cases the defense attorney is responsible for managing. 215 Adding to the
defense attorney’s challenges of preparing for plea bargaining, she may not
have access to the same information as the prosecutor. 216
Prior to the plea-bargaining meeting between the attorneys, the
prosecutor will have information from the arresting officer or officers about
the alleged reason for the defendant’s arrest. The prosecutor will also have
information available about the defendant’s prior criminal history, if any
exists. When reviewing this information and assessing what, if any, charges
will be brought, the prosecutor will likely be guided by whatever the
prevailing rules, procedures, and politics are within the district attorney’s
office in which they work. It is also likely that this will be one of many cases
in an overflowing caseload that the prosecutor must manage.
Based on this limited information and the other caseload demands, the
prosecutor is compelled to make a snap judgment about whether or not this
case is likely winnable at trial and what are the acceptable parameters of any
plea bargain.

213
Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer as Effective Negotiator: The
Systemic Approach, in ALKON & SCHNEIDER, NEGOTIATING CRIME, supra note 207, at 214–
15.
214
See id. at 215.
215
See, e.g., Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Jugal K. Patel, One Lawyer, 194 Felony Cases, and
No Time, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/01/3
1/us/public-defender-case-loads.html [https://perma.cc/HDU5-MSN3] (highlighting how one
public defender in Louisiana did not have the requisite time needed to provide an adequate
defense for each client because of his large case load).
216
Cynthia Alkon, The Right to Defense Discovery in Plea Bargaining Fifty Years After
Brady v. Maryland, 38 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 407, 417 (2014) [hereinafter Alkon,
The Right to Defense Discovery]; Schneider & Alkon, Bargaining in the Dark, supra note 63
(highlighting the information asymmetry between defense attorneys and prosecutors and how
this asymmetry challenges the integrity of plea bargaining).
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Defense attorneys and prosecutors usually engage in plea bargaining
with this limited information and no other preparation. 217 District attorneys
have an obligation to share exculpatory evidence with the defense. 218 But, in
some district attorney’s offices, there is disagreement about what evidence is
exculpatory and what is not. This gives the prosecutor an advantage during
plea bargaining because of the asymmetry of available information to each
side. 219 Recently, there has been a movement to require prosecutors to share
all evidence—not just exculpatory evidence—related to the case with
defense attorneys. 220 Although some district attorneys, like Eric Gonzalez in
the Brooklyn District Attorney’s office, require that good practice and
transparency mandates that evidence be shared, this practice is not the
norm. 221
The defense attorney is usually the one who initiates the meeting, even
though the prosecutor may do so, too. 222 It is not uncommon for the plea
negotiation to be an impromptu meeting in a corner of the courtroom or a
hallway or during an impromptu phone call and to last under five minutes. 223
During this brief negotiation, the conversation between the prosecutor and
defense attorney is usually dominated by charges, proposals for counter
charges, and disposition options. When the negotiation concludes, either after
the meeting or after the defense attorney has followed-up and consulted with
her client, there is a strong likelihood that the defendant will accept the plea

217

See, e.g., McConville & Mirsky, supra note 184, at 221.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1963).
219
Alkon, The Right to Defense Discovery, supra note 216; Schneider & Alkon,
Bargaining in the Dark, supra note 63.
220
See, e.g., Gonzalez, supra note 46; Christian Nolan, New York Removes the Blindfold,
N.Y. ST. B. ASSN J. 12–13 (May 2019), https://nysba.org/NYSBA/Publications/Bar%20
Journal/PastIssues2000present/2019/NYSBA_Journal_MAY19_WEB.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LM2Q-ZSAL] (describing N.Y. law that requires prosecutors to share
information within days of arraignment and allows defendants to see all information that
prosecutors have before pleading guilty).
221
See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 245.25 (MCKINNEY 2019); see also Gonzalez, supra note 46
(Brooklyn District Attorney Eric Gonzalez’s criminal justice initiative).
222
In many jurisdictions, including in Fort Worth, the first offers are often made
electronically when defense attorneys first get discovery in the case. Some jurisdictions set
aside days and times for plea offers and negotiations. Complicating this issue further, there is
no good data about who makes the first offer and whether these offers are accepted. See, e.g.,
Alkon, Plea Bargain Negotiations, supra note 63, at 402–03 (describing the plea-bargaining
process).
223
Yoffe, supra note 4; see also Ronald F. Wright, Jenny Roberts & Betina Wilkinson,
The Shadow Bargainers, CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3577322.\ (discussing how little time is spent on the plea-bargaining
process).
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and a justice agreement will be reached. After all, approximately 97 percent
of federal cases are resolved by plea bargaining. 224
Even if the African American male defendant is innocent, he may opt
to plead guilty. 225 In cases where the prosecution charges the defendant with
a misdemeanor, he may plead guilty to just get out of court and resume his
life. 226 However, pleading to a misdemeanor, even though this may appear
to be a realistic option under the circumstances, may come at a high cost. 227
In the event the defendant is arrested again and tries to plea bargain a justice
resolution, the original misdemeanor plea may be viewed as a strike against
him in this contemporary plea bargain. 228 Prosecutors will likely charge him
with more serious crimes and, ultimately, offer him a harsher sentence. 229
If he is innocent and prosecutors charge him with a felony, the defendant
may still opt to plead guilty and forego constitutional protections offered by
a jury trial. The defendant may fear the possibility of a higher post-trial
sentence and may agree to the lower sentence prosecutors offered during the
plea bargain. 230 Moreover, the prosecutor knows how to exercise
discretionary powers to intimidate the defendant about the dire consequences
224

Id.
See, e.g., THE TRIAL PENALTY, supra note 40, at 17 (“[A]nywhere from 1.6% to 27%
of defendants who plead guilty may be factually innocent.”); Spohn, supra note 38, at 49;
Rakoff, supra note 43 (estimating that approximately 20,000 are in prison for pleading guilty
for crimes they did not commit); TRUE JUSTICE DOCUMENTARY, supra note 117; MALCOLM M.
FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS PUNISHMENT (1979) (explaining why the court process itself is a form
of punishment that compels some defendants to plea); STUNTZ, supra note 12 (discussing how
innocent persons who are charged with misdemeanors are unfairly treated in the criminal
justice system and compelled to plead guilty without awareness of the long-term consequences
of such pleas); Crespo, supra note 58, at 1306; Yoffe, supra note 4; ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN,
MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN AN AGE OF BROKEN
WINDOWS POLICING (2018) (documenting how the broken windows policy was actually a form
of social control because those accused of low-level crimes were deprived of procedural
justice and punished with the life-long consequences of being branded a criminal).
226
KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 225, at 245; ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT
WITHOUT CRIME 78 (2018); FEELEY, supra note 225.
227
See, e.g., ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, supra note 226, at 78 (2018) (discussing how the
misdemeanor system compels innocent defendants to plead guilty and deprives those pleading
to a misdemeanor of knowing the long-term consequences); see also NYCLA Justice Center
Task Force Report, supra note 43 (highlighting the reasons why innocent defendants plead
guilty and suggesting reforms to minimize the likelihood that innocent defendants will plead
guilty); Ronald F. Wright, Jenny Roberts & Betina Wilkinson, The Shadow Bargainers,
CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3
577322.\ (discussing how little time is spent on the plea-bargaining process).
228
NATAPOFF, supra note 226, at 78; NYCLA Justice Center Task Force Report, supra
note 43.
229
Id.
230
THE TRIAL PENALTY, supra note 40, at 17.
225

124

GREENBERG

[Vol. 111

that will result if the defendant does not accept a guilty plea. First, the
prosecutor is likely to preview the defendant’s fate if he turns down the plea
bargain, piling on charges and concomitant sentences and overreaching when
interpreting the facts to the law. 231 Then the prosecutor will “slide down” to
an offer that more realistically fits the alleged facts and is likely to incentivize
the defendant to plead guilty, even if the defendant is factually innocent. 232
If the African American male defendant is guilty of a crime, the deal his
attorney negotiates for him in plea bargaining is likely to be less favorable
than the plea bargain of a white male defendant for a similar crime. 233
Prosecutors will initially charge him with more serious crimes, make fewer
concessions during the plea bargain, and ultimately cause the judge to
sentence him to longer prison time than a similarly situated white
defendant. 234
As explained below, the existing plea-bargaining process allows the
implicit biases of defense attorneys and prosecutors to emerge and shape the
plea-bargaining process. The speed of the process, the unawareness of or lack
of acknowledgment about the legal actors’ own biases, and the discretion of
prosecutors and defense attorneys all contribute to the negative outcomes for
African American male defendants.
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF PLEA BARGAINING PRIME RACIALIZED
JUSTICE OUTCOMES

When we step back to examine the plea-bargaining process, it is not
surprising that the implicit racial biases of both prosecutors and defense
attorneys taint the justice outcomes for African American male defendants.
The discussion continues by explaining how the nature of implicit biases, the
speed of the plea-bargaining process, and the unfettered discretion of
prosecutors prime racialized justice outcomes.

231
Crespo, supra note 58, at 1315 (discussing prosecutorial discretion and raising whether
subconstitutional procedural reforms could be employed to moderate such discretion).
232
See, e.g., STUNTZ, supra note 12 (explaining that guilty pleas, and the bargaining that
leads to them, are largely invisible and that guilty pleas and quick bargains have become the
system’s primary means of judging a defendants’ guilt or innocence); Spohn, supra note 38
(calling for an overhaul of the sentencing system including the “trial penalty”); THE TRIAL
PENALTY, supra note 40, at 15 (explaining that fewer than 3% of criminal defendants exercise
their Sixth Amendment right to trial because the prosecutor has threatened them with the “trial
penalty” if the defendant refuses the prosecutor’s plea bargaining offer and proceeds to trial).
233
See, e.g., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, supra note 31, at 1142–46 (discussing how
implicit racial bias contaminates the criminal legal system).
234
Id. at 1146–52.
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1. Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys Fail to Own Their Implicit Biases—
Unaware, Unacknowledged, Unexamined
Prosecutors and defense attorneys have an ethical obligation to
acknowledge and manage their own racial biases. 235 Even though social
science research indicates that we all have implicit biases, prosecutors and
defense attorneys—even African American prosecutors and defense
attorneys 236—are often unaware of their own implicit biases towards African
235

See, e.g., CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, (AM. BAR ASS’N
2017) [hereinafter ABA CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION],
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/DefenseFunctionFourthEditi
on/ [https://perma.cc/T7AJ-WF77]. Standard 3-1.6 Improper Bias Prohibited provides:
(a) The prosecutor should not manifest or exercise, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice
based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender
identity, or socioeconomic status. A prosecutor should not use other improper
considerations, such as partisan or political or personal considerations, in exercising
prosecutorial discretion. A prosecutor should strive to eliminate implicit biases, and act to
mitigate any improper bias or prejudice when credibly informed that it exists within the
scope of the prosecutor’s authority.
(b) A prosecutor’s office should be proactive in efforts to detect, investigate, and eliminate
improper biases, with particular attention to historically persistent biases like race, in all of
its work. A prosecutor’s office should regularly assess the potential for biased or unfairly
disparate impacts of its policies on communities within the prosecutor’s jurisdiction and
eliminate those impacts that cannot be properly justified.
The ABA’s Criminal Justice Standards for the Defense Function Standard 4-1.6 Improper Bias
Prohibited provides:
(a) Defense counsel should not manifest or exercise, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice
based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender
identity, or socioeconomic status. Defense counsel should strive to eliminate implicit
biases, and act to mitigate any improper bias or prejudice when credibly informed that it
exists within the scope of defense counsel’s authority.
(b) Defense counsel should be proactive in efforts to detect, investigate, and eliminate
improper biases, with particular attention to historically persistent biases like race, in all of
counsel’s work. A public defense office should regularly assess the potential for biased or
unfairly disparate impacts of its policies on communities within the defense office’s
jurisdiction, and eliminate those impacts that cannot be properly justified.
CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE DEF. FUNCTION, (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) [hereinafter ABA
CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE DEF. FUNCTION], https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crim
inal_justice/standards/DefenseFunctionFourthEdition/ [https://perma.cc/FX6G-RYZJ].
236
See, e.g., Luca Guido Valla & Davide Rivolta, Stereotypical Biases in Black People
Toward Black People, SOC’Y FOR PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. (Mar. 28, 2019),
http://www.spsp.org/news-center/blog/valla-rivolta-biases [https://perma.cc/A7SW-5SGX];
see also Kenneth Lawson, Police Shootings of Black Men and Implicit Racial Bias: Can’t We
All Just Get Along, 37 U. HAW. L. REV. 339, 359–61 (2015); Joshua Correll, Bernadette Park,
Charles M. Judd, & Bern Wittenbrink, The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to
Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1314,
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American male defendants. 237 Many prosecutors and defense attorneys
choose to pursue legal careers in the criminal justice system “to do
justice.” 238 How could they be racially biased? Even though these legal actors
may understand that everyone has implicit biases, they may be more
defensive about acknowledging that they have implicit biases against African
American male defendants.
Sociologist Robin DiAngelo explains that white people are
uncomfortable admitting that they are racist even though everybody is
racist. 239 After all, the term “racist” connotes that the person is bad, and “not
racist” connotes the person is good. 240 Anti-racist educator Ibram X. Kendi
educates that African Americans can be racist, too, because they struggle
with a “dueling consciousness” between wanting to assimilate into the
broader white culture, while still striving to be anti-racist. 241 Cognitive
behavioral psychologists have opened up the conversation by differentiating
between explicit and implicit biases. 242 If it is unconscious, it is “not my
fault.” DiAngelo further clarifies that racism is more complicated, and it is
not uncommon for individuals to resist examining the benefits that have
inured to them just from being white. 243 Those who have white identity may
unconsciously absorb the stereotypical values of a white collective society
that has based their white identity on viewing Black people as inferior. 244
Rather than acknowledging the moral trauma and guilt that comes with
examining the physical and psychological subjugation the white collective 245
has inflicted on African Americans, the white collective projects onto
African Americans these dehumanizing behaviors that the the white
collective has historically inflicted on them and then blames African
1325 (2002) (detailing a video game study that demonstrates greater proclivity of both white
and black participants to shoot black faces); FORMAN, supra note 12 (explaining how both
black and white people developed and enforced racially discriminatory criminal policies).
237
See, e.g., Adachi, supra note 55; Andrea D. Lyon, Race Bias and the Importance of
Consciousness for Criminal Defense Attorneys, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 755, 760 (2012); Smith
& Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias supra note 5, at 802.
238
Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, Cognitive Bias, and Plea Bargaining, 91
MARQ. L. REV. 183, 187 (2007) (prosecutors take great pride in viewing themselves as
“ministers of justice”); Adachi, supra note 55.
239
DIANGELO, supra note 60, at 73.
240
Id. at 72.
241
KENDI, supra note 59 (explaining how the desire to assimilate is racist because it
perpetuates a bias about those blacks who are not assimilated).
242
See, e.g., BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 7; KAHNEMAN, supra note 8.
243
See, e.g., DIANGELO, supra note 59, at 73.
244
Id. at 122.
245
The term “white collective” refers to a perspective of how white people as a group
have benefitted from systemic racism.
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Americans for the white collective’s racism. 246 Such projection manifests
itself in the way we punish African Americans, 247 the way we mass
incarcerate them, 248 and the way we execute them. 249
Of course, there are enlightened prosecutors and defense attorneys who
have acknowledged their implicit biases. 250 That is an important first step,
but more needs to be done. As DiAngelo explains, white people need to
examine not only their individual responsibility, but also the many ways the
perpetuation of white dominance—including through the subjugation of
Black people—continues to allow racial discrimination in our world and in
plea bargaining. 251 Society must recognize that defenses such as, “I have
Black friends,” or, “I was in the Peace Corps,” are unhelpful rationalizations
that prevent them from beginning to engage in a more racially-neutral manner
that is less influenced by their implicit biases. 252 Only when white people
acknowledge how they benefit from the status quo and take full responsibility
for their contributions to maintain the status quo can real reform take place.
2. Speed
The speed of the plea-bargaining process itself makes it more likely that
the implicit biases towards African American men will emerge. Daniel
Kahneman explains we think in two ways: System 1, a faster, reactive
process, and System 2, a more thoughtful process. 253 System 1 thinking
includes our implicit biases and stereotypes about African American male
defendants. 254 When we rush to judgment, as in plea negotiations, more often
than not, our System 1 thinking will guide that decision making. To manage
our implicit biases, Kahneman recommends that negotiators slow down the
process so that negotiators will instead rely on System 2 information. 255
246

DIANGELO, supra note 59, at 91.
FORMAN, supra note 12, at 218.
248
Id.
249
Id.; see also Race and the Death Penalty, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/race-anddeath-penalty [https://perma.cc/X3EU-CW5X] (last visited Aug.17, 2020) (stating that a
disproportionate number of imprisoned black people are executed).
250
As an example, Fair and Just Prosecution is a group of forward-thinking prosecutors
dedicated to enhancing fairness in the justice system. See, e.g., 21 Principles for the 21st
Century Prosecutor, FAIR & JUST PROSECUTION (2018), https://fairandjustprosecution.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/12/FJP_21Principles_Interactive-w-destinations.pdf [https://perma.cc/
WA77-N63P].
251
DIANGELO, supra note 59, at 72–73.
252
Id. at 78.
253
KAHNEMAN, supra note 8, at 86.
254
Id.
255
See, e.g., id.; see also Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 48, at 975.
247
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Negotiation theory also teaches that effective negotiation requires
preparation. 256 Part of that preparation involves perspective-taking, including
the management of the negotiator’s own biases. 257 Once the negotiator has
adequately prepared for the negotiation, effective negotiators also know the
importance of scheduling the negotiation so that there is adequate time to
have a meaningful conversation during which there is a thoughtful sharing of
perspectives, an exchange of relevant information, and a common
understanding. 258
The plea-bargaining process, however, is akin to justice proceedings on
steroids. 259 There may be little preparation prior to the meeting. 260 This
leaves the legal actors little time to acknowledge and manage their own
implicit biases about the defendant and get to know the defendant as a human
being. 261 Who is the defendant? What are the extenuating circumstances?
How credible are the witnesses? How reliable is the evidence? These are the
types of questions that do not get answered even though they should, because
implicit racial biases obscure the truth.
Two of the more important questions above left unanswered by this lack
of preparation are what does the evidence objectively show, and how reliable
are the witnesses. 262 As stated earlier, African Americans are more likely
than whites to be profiled as criminals and arrested on a biased hunch. 263
Prior to charging a defendant, and again during the preparation to plea
bargain, prosecutors have a unique opportunity to assess this information and
decline to go forward with the case if the police based the arrest on racial bias
and not merit. 264 Without taking the time to assess the accuracy of this
arresting information, however, the prosecutors may unintentionally be
putting the offices’ imprimatur on racially-biased information and further
decreasing the likelihood that the African American male defendant will get
an equitable justice resolution during plea bargaining.
256

See, e.g., WILLIAM URY, GETTING PAST NO 15–16 (2007) (explaining that preparation
is crucial to a successful negotiation).
257
See, e.g., id. at 52–75; FISHER & URY, supra note 67, at 24.
258
See, e.g., URY, supra note 256, at 48–50.
259
See ALKON & SCHNEIDER, NEGOTIATING CRIME, supra note 207, at 212–16 (explaining
how efficiency, and interest of plea bargaining, may lead to unfair justice outcomes).
260
Cf. id. at 215 (discussing methods of strong preparation for effective plea bargaining).
261
See, e.g., Richardson & Goff, supra note 50, at 2632; Kay L. Levine & Ronald F.
Wright, Images and Allusions in Prosecutors’ Morality Tales, 5 VA. J. CRIM. L. 38 (2017);
Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, supra note 31, at 1159.
262
Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive
Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261, 279–82 (2011).
263
See supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text.
264
Sloan, supra note 50, at 10–12.
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Plea bargaining, as it is practiced today, defies the tenets of good
negotiation practice, ignores the guidance of cognitive behavioral
psychologists, and allows the legal actors involved to be influenced by their
implicit biases. Too often, the prosecutor and defense attorney may view the
other as opponents, instead of negotiators with different perspectives,
working toward a common goal, each seeking to do justice. 265 Moreover, the
prosecutor and defense attorney may each have their own racialized implicit
bias about the defendant that shapes their perception of the defendant’s guilt,
the plea offers, and the agreed-upon justice disposition. 266 As noted above,
with little or no preparation, the actual meeting, whether in-person or
telephonic, may take less than five minutes.
3. Discretion 267
The prosecutor has a large amount of discretion to decide whether or
not to dismiss the case, what crimes to charge the defendant with, and the
range of possible resolutions to consider. 268 “Discretionary justice too often
amounts to discriminatory justice.” 269 No one checks this prosecutorial
discretion, and there are few office rules and little judicial oversight, too. As
would be expected, this discretion allows a prosecutor’s implicit racial biases
265
Cf. ABA CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 235, at
3-1.2(b) (“The primary duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice within the bounds of the law,
not merely to convict.”); ABA CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE DEF. FUNCTION, supra note
235, at 4-1.2(b), (e) (“The primary duties that defense counsel owe to their clients, to the
administration of justice, and as officers of the court, are to serve as their clients’ counselor
and advocate with courage and devotion: to ensure that constitutional and other legal rights of
their clients are protected; and to render effective, high-quality legal representation with
integrity . . . . Defense counsel should seek to reform and improve the administration of
criminal justice.”).
266
See, e.g., Richardson & Goff, supra note 50, 2634–41; Sloan, supra note 50, at 22–26;
Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, supra note 31, at 1142; Maurice Chammah, Do Public
Defenders Spend Less Time on Black Defendants?, MARSHALL PROJECT (May 2, 2016),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/05/02/do-public-defenders-spend-less-time-onblack-clients [https://perma.cc/99EY-9V7H] (discussing how defense attorneys may be
biased).
267
STUNTZ, supra note 12, at 5 (“Discretionary justice too often amounts to discriminatory
justice.”).
268
See, e.g., id.; Spohn, supra note 38, at 78; THE TRIAL PENALTY, supra note 40, at 7;
Smith & Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias, supra note 5, at 807 (stating that
empirical research shows that Americans implicitly connect African Americans with
aggression, hostility, guns, and weapons).
269
STUNTZ, supra note 12, at 5; see also Richard Delgado, Chris Dunn, Pamela Brown &
Helena Lee, Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1359 (1985) (discussing how the lack of structure and
rules are more likely to allow prejudice to emerge).
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to emerge. It colors how the prosecutor selectively processes the available
evidence about the crime and the defendant and influences the prosecutor’s
estimate about the success of securing a conviction at trial. 270
As one example, there is empirical research that shows that individuals
are prone to favoring and empathizing with individuals like themselves. 271
This bias is known as “in-group favoritism.” This becomes evident when a
white prosecutor is prone to be lenient to white defendants. However, when
a white prosecutor makes an equivalent assessment of an African American
man accused of a similar crime, and is thus assessing the African American
man’s guilt, remorse and the appropriate plea to offer, there is no “in-group
favoritism.” Instead, the prosecutor may be unconsciously influenced by
implicit biases of African American men as hostile, aggressive, likely to use
weapons, and prone to criminality. 272 Unless there is oversight, rules, and
procedures to check against such bias, it is likely that such racialized bias
will contaminate the justice outcomes of plea bargaining.
Thus, the process of plea bargaining allows the implicit racial biases of
prosecutors and defense attorneys to emerge and shape unjust outcomes for
African American male defendants. The status quo must change. The next
Section prescribes organizational and individual affirmative steps
prosecutors and defense attorneys can take to help racially debias plea
bargaining.
III. ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL PRESCRIPTIONS TO RACIALLY
DEBIAS PLEA BARGAINING
Readers may be wondering how such a racialized presumption of guilt
could be allowed to continue for so long without criminal justice reformers
intervening and demanding affirmative steps to ameliorate this bias. 273 This
Section takes those overdue steps and prescribes organizational and
procedural debiasing strategies for district attorneys’ offices and public
defenders’ offices and for the prosecutors and defense attorneys who actually
conduct the plea bargaining. The suggested reforms will help contain the
racialized implicit bias of prosecutors and defense attorneys by targeting the
three conditions of plea bargaining that allow racialized implicit biases to
emerge: the lack of self-awareness about one’s racialized implicit biases; the
270

Burke, supra note 238, at 196.
Smith & Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias, supra note 5, at 816.
272
Id. at 818.
273
There has been a floodgate of recommendations to limit prosecutorial discretion in plea
bargaining, increase judicial oversight of plea bargaining, and get rid of plea bargaining in its
entirety. However, this author has been unable to locate any formal debiasing reforms for the
plea bargaining process.
271
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speed of the plea-bargaining process; and the unfettered discretion of
prosecutors. These prescriptions build on the growing support for prosecutors
and defendants to work together for better justice outcomes 274 and culls from
the existing debiasing research. 275 Combined, the recommendations will:
provide legal actors involved in plea bargaining with the skills to manage
their racialized implicit biases; establish a more deliberative plea bargaining
process in which parties share objective information to minimize the reactive
decision making that evokes implicit racial bias; and help implement
procedural safeguards to check the prosecutorial discretion that may be
racially applied.
A. ORGANIZATIONAL DEBIASING REFORMS: WHAT THE DISTRICT
ATTORNEYS’ AND PUBLIC DEFENDERS’ OFFICES CAN DO

Dispute system design specialists teach us that when organizations are
implementing a new goal, the organization should also enact rules,
procedures, and supporting structures that will help achieve that goal. 276
Thus, those district attorneys’ and public defenders’ offices that are
committed to unshackling implicit and explicit racism from plea bargaining
can begin by first voicing this policy goal. Then the organizations’ directors
should reinforce that policy goal with an organizational structure, rules, and
procedures that align and support the goal of minimizing the racialized
presumption of guilt in plea bargaining. The following are specific
suggestions about how organizations may make racial debiasing an
organization goal, operationalize that goal with specific strategies, and
measure the success of the organization’s racial debiasing efforts. 277
274

See, e.g., THE TRIAL PENALTY, supra note 40, at 3 (calling for the end of the trial
penalty as a threat to coerce criminal defendants into accepting pleas); Eppes, supra note 46
(explaining how the task of preventing innocent defendants from pleading guilty was
comprised of prosecutors, public defense attorneys, and judges); FAIR & JUST PROSECUTION,
supra note 46 (discussing public prosecutors who wish to work together to develop
innovations that will promote better justice outcomes).
275
See, e.g., Douglas N. Frenkel & James H. Stark, Improving Lawyers’ Judgment: Is
Mediation Training De-Biasing?, 21 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 22 (2015); Christopher T. Stein
& Michelle Drouin, Cognitive Bias in the Courtroom: Combating the Anchoring Effect
Through Tactical Debiasing, 52 U.S.F. L. REV. 393, 393 (2018); Robert J. Smith, Justin D.
Levinson & Zoe Robinson, Implicit White Favoritism in the Criminal Justice System, 66 ALA.
L. REV. 871, 903 (2015).
276
See Smith & Martinez, supra note 45, at 129–33.
277
The goal is to mitigate racially disparate outcomes. Thus, African American male
defendants who are guilty should not get harsher punishments than similarly situated white
defendants. Moreover, those African American male defendants who are factually innocent
should have their charges dropped as part of the plea bargain, similar to those similarly situated
white defendants.
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Make race debiasing an organizational goal. Explicitly state in your
employee manuals that delivering justice for all means justice without any
racialized presumptions of guilt.
Some readers may be scratching their heads and saying, “Duh! Of
course we don’t support racialized justice.” There is value in stating the
obvious. 278 Take the extra step and identify debiased justice as a priority to
help make all legal actors aware that deracialized justice is an office priority
that is front and center in delivering justice.
Each organization should develop an operational plan that identifies
measurable goals with specific action steps to achieve those goals. 279
Now that debiasing the racialized presumption of guilt is a priority, each
organization needs to operationalize that goal and detail how this plan will
be executed during the everyday workings of the office. This involves
identifying the specific steps that must be taken, when to expect to achieve
measurable results, and how those results will be measured.
Organizations should create a unified organizational structure,
organizational culture, and office policies that provide attorneys with
adequate time and reinforcement to prepare, conduct, and debrief about plea
bargaining. This allows attorneys to defend against their own and their
counterpart’s racialized bias.
Adequate preparation by the attorney should include time to fully
interview, investigate, and assess the evidence’s relative strength to defend
against their own and their counterpart’s racialized bias. This
recommendation presents a challenge for the already underfunded and under-

278

Teresa Colón, The Value of Stating the Obvious, MEDIUM (Apr. 30, 2018),
https://medium.com/personal-growth/the-value-of-stating-the-obvious-e500451125fd
[https://perma.cc/8LFQ-EBKH].
279
See
Operationalize
Your
Strategic
Plan,
PROF.
GROWTH
SYS.,
https://www.professionalgrowthsystems.com/org-culture/operationalize-strategic-plan/
[https://perma.cc/GD8K-TB3C] (explaining how an organization’s goals need to be
operationalized by having a specific day-to-day plan for how the goals will be executed and
achieved); Operationalizing Goals for Action: A Planning Workbook, RIVERLAND CMTY.
COLL., https://www.riverland.edu/about-riverland/office-of-the-president/documents-reports/
planning-workbook-operationalizing-goals-for-action/ [https://perma.cc/9DXU-YE4S] (last
visited Sept. 23, 2019) (containing a workbook for use as a guide for operationalizing an
organizational plan of action).

2021]

UNSHACKLING PLEA BARGAINING

133

resourced defense attorneys. 280 However, the cost of effecting justice is well
worth expending extra time and costs. Preparation prior to the plea
bargaining allows the attorneys to gather and review information about the
defendant and witnesses. Collecting this information, as well as assessing the
evidence’s quality, will help mitigate racialized implicit bias. For the
prosecutor, there should be adequate time to review police information,
assess its accuracy, and ferret out any bias before the prosecutor relies on it.
As stated earlier, police profiling is about stereotyping. 281 The prosecutor
should interview the victim to understand the victim’s true justice interest.
The prosecutor should provide the defense attorney with access to all
evidence. The defense attorney should investigate the case, talk to witnesses,
and visit the scene of the alleged crime prior to plea bargaining to gather
objective information that will help defend against implicit racialized bias.
282

Defense attorneys should have adequate time to interview the defendant
and get to know him as a human being. Humanizing the defendant will help
dispel the defense attorneys’ and prosecutors’ racialized biases by talking
about the defendant as an individual, not a stereotype. If the defendant is in
jail, it is challenging for some attorneys to access the defendant and conduct
the interview. The organizational leaders could work together to make access
easier. If the attorney is having a hard time relating to her client, that is a sign
to pause and examine if the attorney’s implicit racialized biases are
interfering with developing a workable attorney–client relationship.
The office can develop procedures for humanizing and developing
empathy for the client. During regular office meetings, discuss race in every
case debrief. Create teams to provide a check against bias and that support
debiasing any information that will be used in plea bargaining. During case
preparation, plea negotiations, and case debriefs, encourage attorneys to
humanize the client by including other facts beyond the crime allegedly
committed. Have a picture of the defendant other than a mugshot to help view
the client as an individual, not just one more case file. If the defendant does
not have a photo, ask friends or family for one, or, as a last resort, the lawyer
can take a photo of her own.
For offices where each attorney has overflowing caseloads, the
leadership needs to advocate for a more realistic budget that allows attorneys

280

Alkon, Failure to Fix Plea Bargaining, supra note 205, at 579–80.
See supra notes 26–39 and accompanying text.
282
Roberts & Wright, supra note 63, at 1465 (finding that defense attorneys prepare less
for plea bargaining than for trial).
281
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to have manageable caseloads so they can provide clients with justice. 283
Justice may not be cheap, but it is a legal imperative. 284 Furthermore, it is a
preferable moral and economical alternative to spend adequate time
representing a client rather than locking up innocent people or punishing
guilty people with unfair sentences. 285
Organize annual joint plea-bargaining trainings for prosecutors’ and
defense attorneys’ offices that incorporate debiasing strategies to remove the
racialized presumption of guilt.
Now is the time to take the lead and fill in the gap of self-awareness
about racial bias by providing plea-bargaining training that helps prosecutors
and defense attorneys address their racialized presumption of guilt and
approach plea bargaining in a more racially-neutral stance. 286 Existing
training and scholarship on plea bargaining focuses on the cognitive biases
of prosecutors and defense attorneys, but not the implicit racialized bias. 287
This gap defies logic since an overwhelming critique of the system is about
the racialized justice results! 288 Moreover, prosecutors and defense attorneys
283
Cf. Steve Cohen, The Lasting Legacy of a Case that Was “Lost,” 119 PA. STATE L.
REV. 1 (2014) (detailing the legacy of the “Libby Zion” law in New York, adjusting the hours
and supervisory requirements of residents and interns in hospitals following the death of an
eighteen-year-old patient); see also M. Eve Hanan, Big Law, Public Defender-Style:
Aggregating Resources to Ensure Uniform Quality of Representation, 74 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. ONLINE 420 (2018) (arguing that statewide public defender offices should restructure
and pool financial and intellectual resources to provide more effective advocacy).
284
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143–44 (2012) (guaranteeing a criminal defendant’s
right to effective counsel during the plea-bargaining process).
285
A 2015 study by the Vera Institute estimated that the annual “average cost per inmate”
across the United States was $33,274. Prison Spending in 2015, VERA INST. JUST.,
https://www.vera.org/publications/price-of-prisons-2015-state-spending-trends/price-ofprisons-2015-state-spending-trends/price-of-prisons-2015-state-spending-trends-prisonspending [https://perma.cc/FC2G-Z72E] (last visited Sept. 24, 2019). In New York, this
number was estimated to be $69,355. Id.
286
See Roberts & Wright, supra note 63, at 1463 (noting a paucity of plea-bargaining
training).
287
See, e.g., ALKON & SCHNEIDER, NEGOTIATING CRIME, supra note 207. This textbook
was the first comprehensive text on plea bargaining, but it does not address implicit and
explicit racism in plea bargaining.
288
Compare id., with Mitchell & Caudy, supra note 12 (discussing how racial bias causes
racial disparities in drug arrests); Kutateladze & Andiloro, supra note 12 (finding that racial
disparities existed after case screenings based on alleged offenses and discretion exercised),
Devers, supra note 12; STUNTZ, supra note 12, at 2; Goldstein & Schweber, supra note 18;
Berdejó, supra note 5 (discussing racial disparities in plea bargaining outcomes between white
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typically receive training within their own professional silos. The benefit of
having prosecutors and defense attorneys take the training together, however,
is that this allows each side to begin to share and understand each other’s
perspectives, including each other’s racialized biases. 289
As a threshold impasse, most attendees will deny that they are biased.
Therefore, any training needs to include a non-threatening component that
will help the participants become aware of their own biases. In my pleabargaining training modules on implicit bias, I begin with pictures of
convicted criminals, and I ask the group to guess the crime the individual
committed. Of course, this exercise elicits implicit racialized biases. For
many attendees, it is the first moment they become aware of their implicit
biases. Another tool is to recommend that participants take the Implicit
Association Test (IAT), an online test that assesses implicit biases, in the
privacy of their own home or office. This opens the door for attorneys to
examine how racialized biases could infiltrate plea bargaining and make
suggestions about how debiasing strategies can minimize this. For example,
preparing for the plea bargaining by completing a plea-bargaining worksheet
(see Appendix) helps create a more thoughtful and slower process to gather
the information needed. The plea-bargaining simulations should be based on
real-life situations that will help participants practice and reinforce debiasing
skills
These instructional meetings should range from a half day to a full day.
Follow-up and tweaking of these debiasing skills can take place in bimonthly advanced training with practice simulations. As an added incentive,
these exercises could qualify for continuing legal education credit. However,
there is a caveat: Training cannot effectively change people unless there is

and black defendants); Baldus, Pulaski, & Woodworth, supra note 29 (showing that murders
of white victims are eleven times more likely to result in a death sentence than those committed
by black defendants); Spohn, supra note 38 (calling for an overhaul of sentencing procedures
to reduce racial disparities such as the elimination or severely restricted use of the death
penalty and sentencing those convicted of non-serious crimes to diversion programs); Rehavi
& Starr, supra note 44 (finding that the average sentences for black defendants in federal court
were thirty-five months longer than for white defendants); see also Anna Roberts,
(Re)Forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection of Implicit Juror Bias, 44 CONN. L. REV.
827, 827 (2012) (suggesting that jurors be educated about implicit bias during juror orientation
to help identify implicit juror bias).
289
See Frenkel & Stark, supra note 275, at 34 (explaining how perspective-taking is a
debiasing tool).
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actual organizational follow-up with rules and procedures that support the
goal of removing the racialized presumption of guilt. 290
Collect Data About the Plea-Bargaining Outcomes.
It is helpful for each office to self-assess its justice outcomes. 291 Data
analytics is a useful tool to help each office evaluate if its organizational
strategies were effective in minimizing racial disparities in justice
outcomes. 292 This way, based on the data, organizations can sufficiently
answer questions like: were the plea-bargaining outcomes for similar crimes
different if the defendant was African American or white? As with all data
collections, the data answer some questions and raise others. How should an
organization be held accountable if racial disparities in justice outcomes
persist? If data is collected on individual prosecutors and defense attorneys,
will these legal actors be penalized if they do not improve? These data are
one more helpful measure for organizations to reinforce what is working
while also reassessing the additional training and procedural needs of each
office.
Hold conferences that include both state and federal legal actors
involved with plea bargaining.
There has been a rigid, artificial line between state and federal legal
actors involved with plea bargaining that should be removed to address the
racialized presumption of guilt. State and federal legal actors involved with
plea bargaining are often unaware of the policies and procedures each office
uses to ensure justice outcomes. 293 Moreover, there is a patchwork of
different rules and procedures among district attorneys’ offices and public
defenders’ offices within the same state. Adding to the variations in plea
290

See, e.g., Briefing on Racial Disparities and Prosecutorial Practices in the
Connecticut Criminal Justice System Before the Connecticut Advisory Committee of the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights 4 n.11 (Apr. 2, 2019), https://fairandjustprosecution.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/07/FJP-Komar-Statement-Final-7.2.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/QDL4BKVF] [hereinafter Komar Briefing] (statement of Liz Komar) (citing a 2018 study from the
Equality and Human Rights Commission reporting on the limits on implicit bias training).
291
See Schneider & Alkon, Bargaining in the Dark, supra note 63( (data helps disclose
racially disparate justice outcomes); Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action,
103 MINN. L. REV. 303 (2018); Megan Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to
Pay Bail Affects Case Outcomes, 34 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 511 (2018).
292
Komar Briefing, supra note 290, at 5.
293
See, e.g., Elayne E. Greenberg, Adding Value to Conversations about Criminal
Reform, A.B.A. DISP. RESOL. MAG. 2 (2020).
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bargaining, the federal system has an entirely different plea-bargaining
system from state systems. 294 There is minimal opportunity for the attorneys
in the different offices and systems to convene and learn from each other.
However, if the different groups met, legal actors may welcome the treasure
trove of ideas from each office. 295 Let’s turn to the steps that individual
prosecutors and defense attorneys should take to help racially debias the way
the conduct plea bargains.
B. PROCEDURAL DEBIASING STRATEGIES FOR INDIVIDUAL DEFENSE
ATTORNEYS AND PROSECUTORS TO USE NOW

While public defenders’ offices and district attorneys are reorganizing,
there are more immediate steps individuals can take to prepare for their next
plea bargain.
Become aware of your own racialized implicit biases.
Take the IAT at: https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/takeatest.html.
Through this lens, individuals should consider the other racialized judgments
they may have made when they were representing an African American male
client during plea bargaining because of implicit bias.
Use debiasing techniques when preparing for the next plea bargain.
For defense attorneys, when interviewing a client, get to know him as a
human being. 296 How easy it is to treat the defendant as one more case, when
there are an overwhelming number of cases to manage. Defense attorneys
should thoroughly investigate, as if preparing for trial, to get objective
information to help debias. 297 This objective information will slow attorneys
down and promote a more deliberative process.
Defense attorneys can use a checklist tool as a procedural safeguard
with questions that ask if attorneys would handle the case differently if the
client was a different race. 298 For prosecutors, this is an opportunity to review
294

See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (outlining procedures to enter and proceed with plea
negotiations and agreements).
295
I was a member of the NY plea bargaining task force in which the members included
legal actors from state and federal courts. During the ensuing conversations, the state legal
actors were surprised to learn about the more deliberative process that goes on in federal court
before a suspect is charged. The state actors then began to consider how they too could create
a more deliberative process before a decision is made to charge a suspect.
296
See, e.g., Adachi, supra note 55 (discussing an example in which a defense lawyer
learned more about her client and his family, which helped her humanize her client).
297
Roberts & Wright, supra note 63, at 1465.
298
Adachi, supra note 55.
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the arrest information with a cautious eye that understands how the racialized
implicit biases of police, de facto policies of racial profiling, and rapid
decisions to charge increase the likelihood that the information relied upon
is biased. Similar to their defense colleagues, prosecutors can develop their
own checklist to question whether they would handle the case differently if
the defendant was a different race. Both defense attorneys and prosecutors
could find a motivated colleague in the office who can serve as another check
on whether an attorney’s advocacy is tinged with racialized bias. 299 This
colleague can then also join in the systemic efforts to check racial bias in plea
bargaining. Thus, individual attorneys can enlist their colleagues to help
debias individual’s and office efforts to help make plea bargaining a more
racially neutral process.
Empathy.
Both prosecutors and defense attorneys may find that empathizing with
African American male defendants is another antidote that buffers the toxic
effects of racialized implicit bias in plea bargaining. 300 Empathy is a
cognitive, emotional, and behavioral process in which the person puts
themselves in the other’s shoes. 301 When we empathize, we slow our thought
process down and shift from a reactive process to a more deliberative one. 302
In this more deliberative stance, we are likely to see the humanity of the other
person, rather than viewing them through a distorted, biased lens. 303 Not only
does the recipient of empathy benefit, but the empathizer does, too. Empathy
reduces the cognitive dissonance prosecutors and defense attorneys
experience by creating more consistency between their explicit
nondiscriminatory intent and their implicit biases. 304
Plea-Bargaining Worksheet—Humanize the client (See Appendix A).

299

Id.
See, e.g., Elayne E. Greenberg, Bridging Our Justice Gap with Empathetic Processes
that Change Hearts, Expand Minds About Implicit Discrimination, 33 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 441, 441 (2017). Even though individuals have different capacities to empathize, an
individual can learn to expand their ability to empathize. However, empathy is not an
unlimited resource. At times, a person may intentionally withhold empathy as a protective
measure to preserve their own emotional well-being. Id. at 453–62.
301
Id. at 454.
302
Id. at 453.
303
Id.
304
Id.
300
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The plea-bargaining worksheet is an essential prerequisite to debiasing
plea bargaining. It provides prosecution and defense colleagues with an
opportunity to slow down the process and engage in a more thoughtful
inquiry about what, based on the particular client, is the most equitable way
to resolve this matter. The worksheet requires the attorneys to provide, share,
and question information based on objective rationales towards seeking
justice. Moreover, the worksheet engages attorneys to give thought to
multiple justice options rather than just horse-trading charges and
concessions.
Schedule the Plea Bargaining.
If an individual is serious about debiasing plea bargaining, the pleabargaining negotiations need to be moved from congested courthouse
corridors to a quiet meeting place where a respectful focus can be devoted to
negotiating justice. Furthermore, it needs to be scheduled for a time when
both prosecutors and defense attorneys have adequate time to prepare. And
don’t forget to bring coffee! Bringing coffee or other refreshments helps set
the tone to have a thoughtful negotiation during which parties can share
information, question one another, and appreciate the high stakes of
justice. 305
During the plea bargaining, share information and talk about the client
as a human being. Don’t just horse trade charges. Decide, for this client,
what an equitable justice outcome is.
If prosecution and defense attorneys have adequately prepared for the
plea negotiation, the ensuing negotiation should be a conversation during
which the parties share information and problem-solve to seek an equitable
justice outcome. In this slower, more deliberative process there is an
opportunity to explicitly address concerns about implicit bias. Respectful
305
Prosecutors and defense attorneys, both essential legal actors in our justice system,
may view their justice contributions differently. According to the ABA Criminal Justice
Standards for the Prosecution Function, prosecutors “seek justice within the bounds of law,
not merely to convict.” ABA CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra
note 235, at 3-1.2(b). The ABA Criminal Justice Standards for the Defense Function explicitly
provide that “[t]he primary duties that defense counsel owe to their clients, to the
administration of justice, and as officers of the court, are to serve as their clients’ counselor
and advocate with courage and devotion; to ensure that constitutional and other legal rights of
their clients are protected; and to render effective, high-quality legal representation with
integrity.” ABA CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE DEF. FUNCTION, supra note 235, at 4-1.2(b).
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questioning by the defense attorney to the prosecutor about whether the
prosecutor is likely to make similar offers and concessions if the defendant
was white helps remind the prosecutor that prosecutorial discretion should
not be influenced by race. Parties should refer to the plea-bargaining
worksheet as a helpful guide to ensure that both parties share and process the
important information that is relevant in coming to an appropriate resolution.
The defendant’s picture, other than a mugshot, will help humanize the client
and debias the racialized implicit biases that both defense attorneys and
prosecutors may have about the defendant.
Counseling the Client.
Before an attorney counsels a client, the attorney must decide what is
the relevant information to gather, and what are the appropriate options for
the client. Counseling a client involves ambiguity and discretion, conditions
that allow racial implicit biases to emerge. Therefore, when a defense
attorney counsels an African American male defendant, the attorney must
ensure that the attorney’s own racial biases about the defendant do not
compromise the quality of guidance the attorney provides. Defense attorneys
can check these biases by engaging in more mindful counseling. 306 What are
acceptable plea offers for this defendant? What are the full ramifications of
accepting a plea, not only for the present legal matter, but for the remainder
of the defendant’s life? Is the defense attorney counseling the African
American male defendant in the same way the attorney would counsel a
similarly situated white defendant? The answers to these questions will assist
defense attorneys when they reevaluate whether the way they counsel
African American male defendants is shaped by the defense attorney’s
implicit racial biases.
C. YES, BUT . . .

Each of the organizational and individual debiasing prescriptions
described above, although a step forward, will not unshackle the racial biases
from plea bargaining. Rather, they provide an opportunity for legal actors to
become aware of how their racialized biases affect the plea-bargaining
process and the justice outcomes for African American male defendants. This
is an ongoing examination, and hopefully as more recommended suggestions

306

Adam Lueke & Bryan Gibson, Mindfulness Meditation Reduces Implicit Age and Race
Bias: The Role of Reduced Automaticity of Responding, 6 J. SOC. PSYCH. & PERSONALITY SCI.
284, 284 (2014) (discussing how mindful meditation helps reduce implicit age and race bias).

2021]

UNSHACKLING PLEA BARGAINING

141

become a regular part of plea-bargaining practice, they will help to create a
culture of change.
Still, some may point to other debiasing reforms that have scrubbed the
racial identity of the defendant to ensure a fairer justice outcome. 307 True,
scrubbing the identity of African American male defendants accused of
minor traffic violations yields more equal justice outcomes. However, in
cases that involve plea bargaining, it is imperative that the legal actors
accurately appreciate the defendant’s humanity. Scrubbing the racial identity
of that African American defendant obscures that humanity and perpetuates
the deep-rooted racial bias towards African American males in the criminal
justice system writ large.
Others have read the proposals, agreed that they are likely effective, but
qualified their endorsement: “. . . but it will require more money.” How
sobering! Are some willing to maintain the status quo of racialized justice
because it is more affordable to maintain the status quo? This author posits
that the humanity of all demands justice for all.
CONCLUSION
This Article chronicles racial discrimination’s deep historical roots in
American society and criminal justice system and explains how this
discrimination continues to shape the racialized presumption of guilt in plea
bargaining. The Article then prescribes structural and procedural debiasing
reforms that build on implicit bias and anti-racist scholarship. The purpose is
to motivate us to get past our personal defenses and comfort zone about race
and compel us to take more meaningful action. District attorneys’ offices,
public defenders’ organizations, and the prosecutors and defense attorneys
who work within these organizations are the primary legal actors who control
plea bargaining. They are also the legal actors who have the power to become
legal change agents within their plea-bargaining sphere of influence.
“[T]o bring about change, [you] must not be afraid to take the first
step . . . . [T]he only failure is failing to try.” 308 We can begin to mitigate this
307
See, e.g., Sunita Sah, Christopher T. Robertson, & Shima B. Baughman, Blinding
Prosecutors to Defendants’ Race: A Policy Proposal to Reduce Unconscious Bias in the
Criminal Justice System, 1 BEHAV. SCI. & POL’Y 69, 69 (2015); Evan Sernoffsky, SF DA
Gascón Launching Tool to Remove Race When Deciding to Charge Suspects, S.F. CHRONICLE
(June 12, 2019), https://www.sfchronicle.com/crime/article/SF-DA-Gasc-n-launching-toolto-remove-race-when-13971721.php [https://perma.cc/SQ89-H6MN] (introducing a worldfirst application of artificial intelligence to “scrub” information from police reports that would
be suggestive of a person’s race).
308
ROSA PARKS & GREGORY J. REED, DEAR MRS. PARKS: A DIALOGUE WITH TODAY’S
YOUTH 97 (1996).
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racialized presumption of guilt against African American male defendants
today. Individual prosecutors and defense attorneys can begin to implement
some of these suggestions immediately in their next plea bargain. District
attorneys’ offices and public defenders’ organizations can begin announcing
today that mitigating the racialized presumption of guilt is an organizational
priority. They can then affirmatively take the steps necessary to reinforce that
priority. Colleagues who are purveyors of justice in their writings, teachings,
social activism, spirituality, personal living, and political support can use
their sphere of influence to call attention to this racial injustice and help
galvanize debiasing reform.
Still, some readers may believe that, given the depth and amount of time
that racism has persisted, racism is an intractable scorn that is part of our
human condition. Others, like this author, however, reject the status quo as
intolerable and optimistically believe reform is achievable. No country
should take pride in promises of democracy and “justice for all” while
supporting a presumption of guilt towards its African American male
defendants that taints the negotiated justice process. “History, despite its
wrenching pain, cannot be unlived, [but] if faced with courage, need not be
lived again.” 309
APPENDIX: PLEA-BARGAINING WORKSHEET
I. Name and contact information of the individual who is accused.
Please include the name the individual prefers to be called.
II. Tell more about the individual: Humanize the person (age, gender,
education, family background, employment history). Please include a photo.
III. What, if any, (is)(are) the individual’s previous charges, crimes
and dispositions?
IV. Is the person on probation or parole? Number of times checked
in? Overall compliance? Relationship with parole officer?
309

ANGELOU, supra note 1.
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V. Please describe the alleged crime (what happened, location,
witnesses):
VI. Are there any extenuating circumstances or defenses? If yes,
please explain.
VII. Are there any identifiable political or social factors that may
mitigate/aggravate the gravity of the alleged crime?
Please explain.
VIII. Please identify any bias(es) you might have about the
individual charged with the crime, the type of crime, or the individual
with whom you will plea bargain.
VIIII. Consider the other side’s perspective – If the other side were
completing this worksheet, what information might the other side agree
with?
IX. Consider the other side’s perspective – If the other side were
completing this worksheet, what information might the other side see
differently?
X. What are the client’s primary interests?
For Defense Counsel, your client is the defendant.
For Prosecutors, your client is the people.
Your Client’s:
The Other Side’s Client:
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XI. If you cannot agree on an acceptable plea bargain,
What is your client’s BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated
Agreement) 310?
What is the other side’s BATNA?
XII. During your meeting with the other side, what questions do you
have for the other side? Please state your rationale for asking each
question.
XIII. During your meeting with the other side, what information
about your case and your client do you want to make sure to convey?
Please provide your rationale for the information you wish to convey.
XIV. Given your client’s interests and the interests of the other side,
what are some possible acceptable options to consider? Please explain
how each option might satisfy both sides’ interests.

Thank you!

310
BATNA is the acronym used for the negotiation term “Best Alternative to a Negotiated
Agreement.” Your BATNA is your best course of action if you are unable to resolve the issue
at hand with your negotiating counterpart. See, Fisher, Roger & Ury, William, Getting to Yes
at 101 (Penguin Books 2011).

